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The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan have regained 
prominence in recent years because of the U.S.’ “war on terror” against Al-Qaeda. 
The Government of Pakistan, backed by the U.S. and NATO, is involved in a bloody 
conflict with Taliban sympathizers and other violence entrepreneurs in FATA. But 
this is not the first time that such a conflict has occurred in Pakistan’s frontier. For 
nearly a century, the British experimented with various policies and strategies to try 
and incorporate the tribes who resisted what they considered foreign invasion. This 
thesis will examine the current conflict in the historical context, and analyze the 
relationship between economic development and conflict, specifically in Waziristan, 
where many of the violence entrepreneurs stem from. It will examine the social, 
political and economic structure of the Pashtun society and analyze the impact of war 
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“You don’t speak Paxto; you do Paxto” 
Pashtun Proverb1 
As the U.S.-led “war on terror” plays out in Iraq and Afghanistan, a relatively 
unknown region of the world is quickly taking center stage. Waziristan, a 
mountainous territory in the northwest frontier of Pakistan, has become the site of a 
new conflict that threatens to destabilize the security situation in Southwest Asia. 
Dubbed “wilder than the Wild West” by U.S. President George W. Bush,2 Waziristan 
has become a deadly ground for the clash between the U.S.-backed Government of 
Pakistan and violence entrepreneurs who call themselves the Taliban.  
 Pakistan, a country of 159 million people,3 registered rapid economic growth 
following President Pervez Musharraf’s military coup in 1999. Its gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew at an average rate of 6 percent from 2000 to 2008, 4 thanks to an 
increase in foreign direct investment and aid. The government also introduced policy 
reforms that included cutting the budget deficit, increasing tax revenues, relaxing 
trade restrictions and privatizing state-owned firms.5 Foreign Private Investment from 
                                                 
1 Benedicte Grima, The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women, (Austin, Texas: University of 
Texas Press, 1992), 4. 
2 The White House, “President Bush Discusses Progress in Afghanistan, Global War on Terror,” 
February 15, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070215-1.html. 
3 The World Bank Group, “Pakistan Data Profile,” World Bank Development Indicators Database, 
April 2007, http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=PAK. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Moreau, Ron, “Promise in Pakistan: What’s Behind one of the World’s Most Economic Success 
Stories?” Newsweek, March 27, 2006. 
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2006 to 2007 alone increased by nearly 80 percent to $7 billion.6 Agreements to 
develop new projects, such as the Gwadar port and a potential gas pipeline between 
Iran, Pakistan and India, also boosted hope for Pakistan’s economy, which fledged for 
most of the 1990s.   
But the economy overheated in 2008. Average inflation from FY2007 to 
FY20087 rose to 12 percent.8 Inflation in June 2008 of 21.5 percent, compared to June 
2007, was the highest since the 1970s.9 The Pakistani rupee has depreciated by more 
than 20 percent against the U.S. dollar since June 2007.10 Foreign Private Investment 
declined by 25.7 percent to $5 billion during FY2008.11 While the State Bank of 
Pakistan’s provisional data indicates that GDP grew by almost 6 percent in FY2008,12 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has said that the Government of Pakistan 
needs to tighten its fiscal and monetary policies and reduce the external account 
deficit to strengthen its economy.13  
The political and social climate of the country has also deteriorated. Then-
President Pervez Musharraf’s sacking of the judges and chief justice of the Supreme 
Court in November 2007 caused uproar in the legal community. Former Prime 
                                                 
6 State Bank of Pakistan, “Net Inflow of Foreign Investment in Pakistan,” 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/NetinflowSummary.pdf. 
7 FY stands for Fiscal Year. 
8 State Bank of Pakistan, “Trends in Inflation,” http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/pricei.pdf. 
9 Sahar Ahmed, “Pakistan Needs Tighter Fiscal, Monetary Policy – IMF,” Reuters, July 25, 2008,  
http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINSIN2956120080725. 
10 Ibid. 
11 State Bank of Pakistan, “Net Inflow.” 
12 State Bank of Pakistan, “Real GDP (Sector Wise Data),” 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/ecodata/GDP_table.pdf. 
13 International Monetary Fund, “Transcript of a Press Briefing by David Hawley, Senior Advisor, 
External Relations Department, IMF,” July 24, 2008. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2008/tr080724.htm. 
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Minister Benazir Bhutto was killed in December 2007, putting into power her 
widower Asif Zardari, who spent years in prison on numerous corruption charges. 
Musharraf stepped down from his post on August 18, 2008 amid impeachment 
charges drawn up by a coalition of opposition parties. While his resignation was 
celebrated by many, it has left the country devoid of a leadership and there is little 
agreement even among the opposition groups on who should be elected. Amid the 
economic and political woes facing the country, the surge of Taliban sympathizers 
and violence entrepreneurs14 in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) has created 
a dilemma for the Pakistani government and Western powers, and threatens to not 
only further destabilize the already-precarious security situation in Pakistan but also 
the “war on terror” being fought by the U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and 
against Al-Qaeda.  
Table 1– Pakistan’s Data Profile 
 2000 2005 2006 
Population, total 138.1 million 155.8 million 159 million 
Population Growth (annual %) 2.4 2.4 2.1 
GDP (current US$)* 74 billion 109.5 billion 126.8 billion 
GDP growth (annual %) 4.3 7.7 6.9 
GNI per capita (current US$)** 490 720 800 
Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows 
(current US$) 
308 million 2.2 billion 4.3 billion 
Official development assistance and 
official aid (current US$) 
692.4 million 1.6 billion 2.1 billion 
 
Source: The World Bank Group, “Pakistan Data Profile,” 2007. 
 
                                                 
14 “Violence entrepreneurs” are rebels who gain from war politically and/or commercially, and head 
private military organizations that run protection rackets at the expense of the general public. See Paul 
Collier, V.L. Elliott, Havard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambinas, 
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, (Washington, DC: World Bank and 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 82-89. 
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NOTE:     *GDP = gross domestic product 
**GNI per capita = gross national income per capita 
 This thesis will examine the historical, economic, political, religious and 
cultural forces impacting the conflict in Waziristan. It will explore the history of the 
region, focusing on British colonial history, and will also analyze the current conflict 
in a historical context. The definitions of tribe and state will be examined. 
Furthermore, this research will utilize conflict theories to study the relationship 
between economic conditions and war in Waziristan. The paper will shed light on the 
impact of foreign aid on the conflict and, in turn, the effect of war on one of the most 
marginalized groups in Waziristan - women. This thesis also will analyze the role of 
women in the region, their part in the development process, and their role in the 
conflict.  
I. Land of Insolence15 
 Waziristan, divided into North and South agencies, is part of Pakistan’s seven 
semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Waziristan also 
includes tribal areas adjoining the Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and the Dera Ismail Khan 
districts of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).16 FATA, encompassing 27,220 
square kilometers, forms a 1,200-kilometer boundary with Afghanistan.17  
FATA was created in 1893 following the establishment of the Durand Line, 
named after Sir Mortimer Durand who negotiated the delineation with the Amir of 
                                                 
15 Mountstuart Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 2nd ed. (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), 80. 
16 The Crisis Group, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants. (Brussels, Belgium: Asia 
Report No. 124, 11 December 2006).  
17 Hassan Abbas, “Profile of Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown 
Foundation, 4, no. 20 (19 October 2006): 2. 
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Afghanistan. The arbitrary border, drawn up by the British to distinguish their 
territory and sphere of influence from that of the Amir, split Pashtun communities 
between Afghanistan and the Raj, and upon partition of the Indian subcontinent in 
1947, became the permanent border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Past 
governments in Afghanistan have rejected the Durand Line, saying that it was never 
meant to be a formal international boundary. According to Afghanistan, the 
demarcation by the British did not apply after Pakistan was created.18 Pakistan has 
vehemently denied this position, claiming that since the treaty that created the Durand 
Line would never expire, the border is legitimate. Previous governments of 
Afghanistan, encouraged by the Russians, have also called for the self-determination 
of Pashtuns in the form of an independent Pukhtunistan, which has never existed as a 
political entity. 
FATA has a predominantly Pashtun population of 3.2 million, about 2 percent 
of Pakistan’s population, according to the 1998 government census.19 South 
Waziristan is the largest agency in FATA; it is 6,620 square kilometers in area with a 
population of 425,000 comprising mainly of the Mahsud and Wazir tribes.20 North 
Waziristan, 4,707 square kilometers in area, is the second largest agency, home to 
about 375,000 people belonging to the Wazir and Dawar tribes.21  
 
                                                 
18 S.M.M. Quraishi, “Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Pacific 
Affairs, vol. 39, no. ½ (Spring – Summer 1966): 99.   
19 Population Census Organization, Population by Province/Region Since 1951, Government of 
Pakistan, http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/pco/statistics/pop_by_province/pop_by_province.html. 
20 Abbas, “Pakistan’s Tribal Agencies,” 4. 
21 Ibid. 
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Figure 1 - Pakistan’s Tribal Lands 
 
 
Source: PBS, “Return of the Taliban,” Frontline. 
* Pakistan’s tribal areas comprise of seven agencies bordering Afghanistan. The Khyber Pass is the 
historic gateway between Pakistan and Afghanistan through which Alexander the Great and founder of 
the Mughal Empire, Babar, passed through.  
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About sixty miles across at its widest point,22 Waziristan’s geography and 
climate is harsh, even more so than the cold, mountainous ranges of Northern 
Pakistan. The southern portion of this “frontier Switzerland” is a “tangled mass of 
mountains;” however, North Waziristan is more open, “consisting of large and fertile 
valleys separated by high barren hills.” 23 The climate is severe, with intensely hot 
summers and cold winters. 
The inhabitants of Waziristan are by and large Pashtun and strict Sunni 
Muslims. Hindu traders resided in the region before the subcontinent was partitioned, 
but left when Pakistan became an independent state and the tribes became a part of 
Pakistan. The Wazirs are the largest tribal group, with the territory named after them, 
but Mahsuds are the dominant tribe. Mahsuds are the most independent and literate of 
all the tribes and have produced many civil and military officers.24 Some of them 
have also established trade and business networks across Pakistan. The two tribes 
have been feuding for decades, with each attempting to court the governments of 
Britain, Afghanistan and then Pakistan to win concessions. Both tribes are proud of 
their reputation as warriors and are known for their blood feuds and rivalries.25 As the 
analysis of conflict in the FATA will show, tribesmen are divided in their loyalties for 
the Taliban and violence entrepreneurs. But unlike their past feuds, this inter-tribal 
conflict has international consequences.  
                                                 
22 Hugh Beattie, Imperial Frontier: Tribe and State in Waziristan, (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 
2002), 1. 
23 Ibid., 2. 
24 Abbas, “Pakistan’s Tribal Agencies,” 4. 
25 Ibid. 
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FATA is divided into three jurisdictions: inaccessible areas, administered 
areas and protected areas.26 In inaccessible areas, the government has little or no 
oversight and the tribes are responsible for regulating themselves; in the administered 
areas, the Political Agent serves as the representative of the government and is in 
charge of overseeing administrative work such as roads and schools and generally 
maintaining order and suppressing crime; in the protected areas, crimes and issues are 
not resolved in the courts, but in the jirga, a council of elders that deals with civil and 
criminal offences in line with rewaj, or custom.27  
While part of Pakistan, Waziristan does not have well-defined political 
boundaries. As anthropologist and former Political Agent Akbar Ahmed said, beyond 
one hundred yards of the main Agency road, the laws and authority of the central 
government are replaced by tradition and customs.28 FATA is included among the 
“territories” of Pakistan under Article 1 of Pakistan’s Constitution. It is represented in 
the National Assembly and the Senate but remains under the direct executive 
authority of the president of Pakistan, and laws framed by the Parliament do not apply 
in FATA unless ordered by the president.29 FATA is governed under the 1901 
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), which allows tribes to settle disputes and issues 
through the tribal jirgas rather than in courts, and regulate their own affairs in 
accordance with their customs.30 
                                                 
26 The Crisis Group, Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, 4. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Akbar S. Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan, Revised Edition, (New York: Routledge, 
2004), xxii.  
29 FATA, “Administrative System,” http://www.fata.gov.pk/subpages/admnsystem.php. 
30 Ibid. 
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Figure 2– Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
 
 
Source: FATA Development Authority. 
* FR = Frontier Regions 
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The Political Agent, appointed by the Pakistani government, serves as the 
intermediary between the tribes and the state and is in charge of implementing 
economic and social plans approved by the federal and provincial governments for 
FATA. The Political Agent, in theory, is also responsible for regulating trade and 
illicit activities in the tribal agencies, although that can be a difficult task for many 
because of the obscure tribal networks that are difficult to infiltrate. There are also a 
host of other positions that fall below that of the Political Agent. The porous Pak-
Afghan border has mostly been left alone by the government, and the tribes, who 
have never fully recognized the official line, cross in and out of Afghanistan freely.  
The current system, which involves minimal government activity in tribal 
areas, was established by the British who wanted to maintain some control in the area 
without completely taking away the tribes’ independence. The controversial FCR,31 
created by the British in 1901, still applies, although Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Syed 
Yousaf Raza Gillani, who took office in February 2008, has called for its abolishment 
under heavy criticism.32  
The dominant group among the tribes is the maliks, or the chiefs, but even 
they possess influence rather than power.33 The maliks act as intermediaries between 
                                                 
31 Dubbed the “Black Law” by locals. Under FCR, FATA is not subject to Supreme Court or High 
Court jurisdiction. Additionally, no federal and provincial laws apply to this area, and the people do 
not pay any taxes. 
32 Ismail Khan, “Implications of Repealing FCR,” Dawn, March 30, 2008, 
http://www.dawn.com/2008/03/30/top4.htm. 
33 Akbar S. Ahmed, Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans: A Critical Essay in Social 
Anthropology, (London: Routledge, 1976), 74.  
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the administration and the tribes.34 The elders traditionally have held great sway and 
serve on the jirga, but even their authority has diminished under the increasing 
influence of young tribesmen who are joining violence entrepreneurs in a rebellion 
against the Government of Pakistan.  
 Visitors to some tribal areas have to be granted special permission by the 
Government of Pakistan to enter those areas, which is difficult to obtain because the 
government has to provide security and armed guards to accompany visitors.35 
II. Living by the Code 
 Pashtuns are also known as Pathans, Pakhtuns, Pukhtuns, Paktoon and have 
been designated various names by colonial administrators, academics and writers. 
According to anthropologist and former Political Agent of South Waziristan, Akbar 
S. Ahmed, they are one of the largest tribal groupings in the world.36 “Pathan tribal 
society is part of the ‘larger’ or ‘greater’ tradition of the Islamic world. To the Pathan 
there is no conflict between his tribal code, ‘Pukhtunwali’, and religious principles 
and he boasts no pre-Islamic period. Islamic principles, cultural mores, and jural 
tradition explain part of Pathan normative behavior.”37 All Pashtun tribes claim 
descent from Qais bin Rashid, who went to Arabia from Kohistan in Afghanistan and 
was converted to Islam by Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century.38 
                                                 
34 Rustam Shah Mohmand, “Understanding Insurgency in FATA: A Civilian Perspective,” Business 
Recorder, February 22, 2008.  
35 Imran Khan, Ghairat Mand Musalman, (Karachi: Shaukhat Khanum Memorial Trust, 1995), 1.  
36 Ahmed, Millenium and Charisma Among Pathans, 6.  
37 Ibid.  
38 Ibid., 7.  
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 While Pashtuns are split on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, they are not 
one and the same. “Though ethnically Pathan, the Afghan government was culturally 
more Persian”39 until the advent of the Taliban. “The Pathan tribes on either side of 
the border saw themselves as the subjects of no power.”40 Unlike tribes in other areas 
of Pakistan, there are not any defined leaders in most Pashtun communities. The jirga 
is elected to arbitrate disputes but the hierarchical structure is less rigid than that of 
other Pakistani tribes in Baluchistan and Sindh. Even the malik is only a liaison 
between the government and his tribe, rather than a leader. In many ways, it is also a 
lawless and anarchic society; there is no one person that holds ultimate power or 
makes decisions.  
 The Pashtuns have often been portrayed as harsh characters by both the 
British and Pakistanis alike. According to Imran Khan, the people were wilder than 
the cowboys he saw in Hollywood movies; every man had a rifle.41 For generations, 
Pashtuns in these areas have been surviving by raids, looting and kidnapping. During 
the time of the British, tribesmen raided the nearby “settled areas” because their harsh 
environments and surroundings presented few other opportunities. 
So long as hungry tribesmen inhabit barren and almost waterless hills, which 
command open and fertile plains, so long will they resort to plundering 
incursions in order to obtain the necessaries of life… The greater part of 
Waziristan is a region of stony nullahs and barren plains, with only occasional 
stretches of cultivated land in the warmer valleys... When writers describe the 
Pathan as having the lawlessness of centuries in his blood, when they state 
that the plundering of caravans and the raiding of the daman have been his 
                                                 
39 Peter J. Brobst, The Future of the Great Game: Sir Olaf Caroe, India’s Independence, and the 
Defense of Asia, (Akron, Ohio: The University of Akron Press, 2005), 104. 
40 Ibid.  
41 C. Collin Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier: 1890-1908, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1932), 179. 
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occupation from time immemorial, what they really mean is that he has been 
forced by his environment to play this role in the drama of life. 42  
 
 According to historian Hugh Beattie, the Pashtuns tend to inhabit their own 
moral world, which is defined by Pukhtunwali.43 Elphinstone described it as a “rude 
system” that would have prevailed “before the institution of a civil government.”44 
For Pashtuns, it is the code of life, with its three main characteristics: honor, 
hospitality and revenge. Ahmed dubs it as the “Pukhtun ideal-type.”45 Its traditional 
features are courage (tora), revenge (badal), hospitality (melmastia), generosity to a 
defeated opponent (nanawatee), and heeding the voice of the jirga, which constitutes 
the tribesmen’ government.46 Pukhtunwali explains the fiercely independent nature of 
the tribes and their constant shuffles amongst themselves and with the reigning 
government.47 The concept of revenge means that blood feuds that started generations 
ago prevail to this day. As the following chapters will show, Pashtuns welcomed 
refugees, fellow Pashtuns and Taliban sympathizers from Afghanistan and other 
central Asian countries under the code of hospitality, which is so important to the 
Pashtuns that often times they will go well above their means to fulfill this duty.  
Under Nanawatai (an extension of Melmastia) a person who has a favour to 
ask goes to the house or tent of the man on whom it depends and refuses to sit 
on his carpet, or partake of his hospitality, until he shall grant the boon 
required. The honour of the party solicited will incur a stain if he does not 
                                                 
42 Khan, Ghairat Mand Musalman, 15.  
43 Beattie, Imperial Frontier, 7.  
44 Elphinstone, Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 100.  
45 Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan, 24.  
46 Ibid.  
47 The concept of Pukhtunwali is unique to the Pashtuns, and is often difficult to grasp by those not 
familiar with this group and the region they inhabit. While looting and killing may not be deemed 
“honorable” in many societies, to the Pashtun, honor comprises of defending one’s religion, custom 
and family, and goes hand in hand with the concept of revenge and courage.  
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grant the favour asked. The giving of hospitality to the guest is a national 
point of honour, so much so that the reproach to an inhospitable man is that he 
is devoid of Pakhtu, a creature of contempt.48  
 
Honor is an especially important characteristic of the Pashtun society, 
especially when it comes to women.  
III. Methodology 
 Waziristan and the FATA region in general has been scantily explored and 
written about. Some of the most important literature about the area has been written 
by British historians. Very few contemporary scholars have focused on the region; 
however, its growing importance in the “war on terror” has put FATA under the 
political and media spotlight. But overall, academic data about the people of 
Waziristan is insufficient, and while the area has taken center stage in the New York 
Times and Pakistani newspapers in recent years, only a few reporters have been able 
to capture the true essence of the conflict and the people. There is even less literature 
about women, understandably so, because most researchers have been male and it is 
very difficult for researchers to break into women’s circles because of the deep 
segregation and isolation of women. A big obstacle in this research has been the lack 
of credible statistics about the economic and social situation of FATA, either from the 
Government of Pakistan or scholars.  
This thesis is based on extensive historical and contemporary qualitative 
research. The whole FATA region in general provides a fascinating study of the 
psyche of Pashtuns and the current conflict that is brewing in Pakistan, but this 
                                                 
48 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans: 550 B.C. – A.D. 1957, (London: MacMillan & Co Ltd, 1958), 351.  
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research specifically aims to explore the region of Waziristan, which is at the 
epicenter of the conflict. The primary sources for this research are historical 
documents compiled by the British, including books and memoirs at the India Office 
Library at the British Library. This research also relies on quantitative data from the 
World Bank, United Nations agencies, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Government of Pakistan and State Bank of Pakistan. Given the dearth of published 
data and academic literature about the FATA, this research also takes incorporates 
news reports, specifically from the BBC, The New York Times and the Pakistani 
press, among others.  
FATA, especially North and South Waziristan agencies, have to be studied 
and analyzed as separate entities from the rest of the nation-state because the 
trajectory of their economic, geopolitical and social development has been very 
different from the rest of the country. In Pakistan’s urban areas, Waziristan is 
popularly known as ilaqa ghair, the “foreign area” or “outside the area”49 where 
murderers, bandits and thieves find refuge. While part of Pakistan, Pashtuns in 
Waziristan do not consider themselves bound by government laws that apply to them. 
Historically, Pashtuns in FATA have had close relations with Afghans. During the 
time of the British rule, Mahsuds and Waziris were paid concessions by the Amir of 
Afghanistan to guard the passes. Nevertheless, the tribes have never proclaimed 
allegiance to any Afghan or Pakistani authority.  
                                                 
49 Akbar S. Ahmed, Pukhtun Economy and Society, (London: Routledge, 1980), 11.  
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Waziristan falls into what Ahmed classifies as a nang group – tribal or “hill” 
Pashtuns that “organize social life according to traditional tribal customs and codes… 
In the absence of any other law, life revolves around ‘Pukhtunwali.’”50 Nang, or 
honor, is the pivotal concept for a Pashtun and is his standard of reference. “In the 
face of severe economic poverty, personal valour, marksmanship and skill in combat 
become the symbols that confer ‘nang’ and therefore status.”51 Waziristan, such a 
nang society, differs from even its neighboring agencies in the way society and 
economy are organized; therefore, it is important to analyze each agency in its own 
context. 
This study is important because there is a dearth of research that sheds light on 
Waziristan in both a historical and contemporary context. In the media, there is 
meager analysis of history and academic literature. In the academic arena, firstly, 
there is sparse work on Waziristan and little emphasis has been placed on field work, 
given the harsh climate and inaccessibility of the region. Secondly, there is very little 
literature that sheds light on the current conflict and examines the “big picture.” There 
is a strong need for a thorough analysis of the economic and social situation of 
Waziristan and to examine all the different factors in the conflict under one umbrella. 
In light of the current situation, it is important to see what impact the economic 
situation and the flow of aid has had on the region. At the same time, tackling 
women’s issues is not an easy task, given the shortage of literature. However, it is 
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important to understand their position in contemporary society as women are often 
one of the first victims of war. 
IV. The Conflict Trap 
 The Uppsala Conflict Database Project defines a civil war as one in which 
there are at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in one year. An active conflict as one in 
which there are at least 25 battle-related deaths per conflict year; an armed conflict 
concerns two parties of which at least one is a government or state.52 Collier and his 
colleagues argue that civil war differs from communal violence in that it involves a 
rebel organization that is armed and has full-time recruits. There is scanty data 
available on the number of conflict-related deaths in Waziristan and government 
statistics are estimates, often understated at best. A paper commissioned by an 
independent, non-profit organization (NGO) called Pakistan Institute of Legislative 
Development and Transparency (PILAT), and written by retired Brigadier Shaukat 
Qadir provides the following “guesstimate” of casualties in FATA:53 
Security personnel dead: approximately 1,500. 
Security personnel wounded: approximately 2,000. 
Security personnel captured/surrendered: approximately 450. 
Known militants dead: approximately 400. 
Known militants wounded: approximately 700.  
Civilians dead: approximately 1,500. 
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Civilians wounded: approximately 3,000. 
While the conflict in Waziristan has not been defined as a “civil war” by 
either the media or the Government of Pakistan, the conflict could be categorized as 
one under Uppsala’s definitions. FATA is sufficiently isolated from the rest of the 
country that its impact has not been felt extensively throughout the state. But after 
years of fighting and breakdown of negotiations between the militants and the 
government, Pakistan is seeing the conflict filter through the mountains of Waziristan 
into the rest of the country in the form of suicide bombings and increasing violence 
among youth in urban cities like Peshawar.54 According to Collier et al., the 
perpetrators of civil war usually adopt the rhetoric that war is necessary for social 
progress.55 The pro-Taliban movement in Pakistan has not only taken an anti-
American stance, it also wants to instill a more rigid Islamic law and has denounced 
President Musharraf for “Westernizing” the country and moving it away from 
shariah, the Islamic law.  
Collier and his colleagues, based on extensive analysis of time series and 
cross-sectional data, argue that once a country stumbles into conflict, its risk of 
further conflict soars, and that the chief legacy of a civil war is another civil war.  
Conflict weakens the economy and leaves a legacy of atrocities. It also creates 
leaders and organizations that have invested in skills and equipment that are 
only useful for violence. Disturbingly, while the overwhelming majority of the 
population in the country affected by civil war suffers from it, the leaders of 
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military organizations that are actually perpetuating the violence often do well 
out of it.56  
 
As our analysis of the conflict in Waziristan will show, the groups who are 
suffering most are the marginalized groups, such as elders, children and women. 
Many children in the region have grown up in refugee camps and are a product of the 
Soviet-Afghan war, Afghanistan civil wars, the Taliban regime and the U.S. invasion 
of that country. This has left a legacy of hatred and remorse, and has had a severe 
impact not only on the social climate of northwest Pakistan but also the psychology of 
children. Madrassahs, religious schools, have grown rapidly and although not all of 
them preach violence, many teach a more radical interpretation of the Qu’ran and 
encourage anti-state and anti-U.S. activities. 
At the same time, the leaders of the rebellion have profited from the drug 
trade from Afghanistan, which reached a record high in 2007 and accounted for 93 
percent of the world’s opium output.57 Pakistan is the main transit route for drugs 
from Afghanistan and the FATA region itself has the largest harvest of opium in 
Pakistan.58 However, drug cultivation in FATA actually declined by 51 percent from 
2003 to 2007; the bulk of opium cultivated in Pakistan is in the Khyber Agency, and 
it is estimated to be around 1.2 percent of the area cultivated in Afghanistan.59 The 
main source of revenues for militants is drug trade from Afghanistan, which is 
concentrated in the hands of the top violence entrepreneurs. Revenue from drug trade 
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has not transformed into better living conditions for the general population or helped 
the infrastructure in FATA.  
Collier et al. argue that economic development is central to reducing conflict, 
and aid has substantial potential for conflict prevention if it is managed correctly.60 
The FATA region is lagging considerably behind the rest of the country in terms of 
economic development measures. Schools are few and far between, and with few 
options for parents to educate their children, madrassahs have flourished. Education 
for women is discouraged by the locals; hence, the government has left the subject 
alone and has not implemented any projects to raise awareness about the important of 
education. Aid, especially from the U.S., has increased considerably since 2002, but, 
as Chapter Three will discuss in more detail, it has thus far not reached the barren 
hills of Waziristan and has done little in the tribal areas to curb the growth of the 
conflict. It remains to be seen whether the increase in aid and related activities will 
help reduce the conflict. So far, it is being used mostly for military build-up and for 
combat support and the Pakistani military has not had much luck in gaining the 
support of the tribes or rooting out what they consider “terrorists.”  
The costs of a civil war are many – economic, social and political. This thesis 
will explore the impact of the conflict on women, who most often end up being the 
biggest victims of human rights violations in such cases. Additionally, the paper will 
analyze the implications of Collier and his colleagues’ conflict trap theory on the 
conflict in Waziristan.  
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V. Tribe and State 
 This thesis will adopt Ahmed’s definition of tribes - a group having a common 
territory, common name, common language, common culture, common descent, 
common religious belief and some form of political organization. He defines a 
Pashtun as one who can trace his lineage through the father’s line to one of the 
Pashtun tribes, and in turn to the apical ancestor. Pashtun tribal society “is not a stage 
in a typological sequence, band-tribe-chiefdom-state, but in its exclusive core nang 
areas, it presents a discrete self-sufficient socio-cultural category that has successfully 
perpetuated itself over centuries, while simultaneously exhibiting various complex 
forms in other areas as a result of changing economic and political situation.”61 This 
is evident in the case of Waziristan, from where men have migrated to other cities, be 
it Peshawar, Karachi or Dubai, to find livelihoods. The core society in Waziristan has 
evolved distinctly from the rest of the country under its own code of Pukhtunwali.  
 The Wazirs and Mahsuds have been defined by historians as an egalitarian 
society in which no one man holds more authority than another.62 Ahmed stated: “The 
saying, ‘every man is a malik unto himself’ is understood literally in the tribal 
areas.”63 It is, however, a class-based society, and the more influential men and those 
who control trade are the richest. 
 There are numerous definitions of a state in various academic disciplines. For 
the purpose of this research, a state will be defined as a set of political institutions 
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with the concept of legal authority and a set of laws enforced by a governing group.64 
The idea of Pakistan as a “state” has been debated by many, especially in light of the 
current separatist movements that have been gaining momentum in various regions of 
the country.  
As discussed, the FATA region presents an unusual situation because while 
officially it is part of the state of Pakistan, it is not subject to the country’s laws and 
regulations and even presidents have exercised authority over the region cautiously. 
While international institutions have been urging the Government of Pakistan to 
change these laws, doing so may not be easy because the Pashtuns value their 
independence greatly. At the same time, the government is afraid that calls for an 
independent “Pukhtunistan” that emerged after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 may 
be revived. The Awami National Party, the Pashtun nationalist political party, won an 
overwhelming majority in the NWFP in the national elections held in February, 
ousting the Islamist parties that gained control in 2002.  
Separatist demands by Pashtun national groups have been based on the view 
that geographically and historically, NWFP was always distinct from the rest of South 
Asia; physically, culturally and linguistically, Pashtuns are different from other 
Pakistanis and have had less representation in the government and army, which is 
dominated by Punjabis.65 But in the nang areas, the government of Pakistan kept its 
involvement minimal, until 2002, when it began combat operations to oust Taliban 
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sympathizers attacking North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces across the 
border in Afghanistan and vying to establish an Islamic republic in the tribal areas.   
VI. Conflict Actors 
 “As I traveled through Pakistan and particularly the Pashtun lands bordering 
Afghanistan, I felt as if I were moving through a Taliban spa for rehabilitation and 
inspiration,” wrote one New York Times journalist.66 It is difficult to pinpoint one 
militant movement and to distinguish the pro-Taliban militants from the actual 
Taliban. According to some, the Taliban title was only inherited from the press.  
The media began to call them (the militants) Taliban and Al-Qaeda, which 
they were not, but they accepted the titles with pride because, from being 
hated, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda suddenly became the symbol of those 
resisting the all-powerful US. Today, undoubtedly most of them have become 
Taliban and many certainly have Al-Qaeda connections, though that is not 
how they started.67  
 
However, like the Taliban that ruled Afghanistan in the 1990s, these local 
groups have also drawn on “tribal” solidarity, and fortified their movement by a 
revivalist style of Islam that emerges from the periphery to take control of an existing 
state.68 Initially, the Pakistani government focused on ousting the “foreign Taliban,” 
which not only included Afghanis, but also Uzbeks, Chechens and even Uighurs who 
came to wage jihad first against the Soviet Union and then the U.S. Waziristan served 
as the main transit point for Taliban, Arabs and other foreign fighters escaping U.S. 
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military operations in Afghanistan.69 The foreigners found refuge in these areas under 
the code of hospitality following the U.S. invasion in 2001. Many of them were 
absorbed into local tribes through marriage with local women. Now, the focus has 
shifted away from these foreigners to local militants, many of whom have spawned 
their own organizations. The popularity of the local Taliban has been defined by 
military experts: 
Fiercely independent, the Pashtuns have always defended their homeland 
against foreign interlopers. No outside power has ever been able to subdue 
them completely. They defeated most of their would-be conquerors outright or 
absorbed them into their tribes through the centuries. The Pashtuns adapted to 
the military strategies of their invaders, and then utilized their new tactics and 
equipment to fight among themselves until confronted by another external 
threat. This military orientation has shaped the Pashtun – and Taliban – 
outlook: “A Pashtun is never at peace, except when he is at war.” The 
Pashtuns are inclined not to accept any form of strict authority, even at the 
cost of discord and insecurity.70 
 
The umbrella group of the militant organizations is “Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan,” the Pakistani Taliban Movement. It did not merge with the organizational 
structure of the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Omar, but developed its own distinct 
identity and was accepted as a legitimate voice in North and South Waziristan 
agencies.71 It established itself as an alternate leadership to the traditional tribal elder 
structure, and thus far, has killed more than 200 tribal elders who it regarded as 
Pakistani or U.S. spies.72 The leader of the group is Baitullah Mehsud, who created 
the organization in December 2007 and was accused by the Pakistani government of 
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assassinating former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Mehsud has been blamed for 
many of the 56 suicide bombings in Pakistan and is reported to have command of 
some 20,000 fighters.73 Another organization, “Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-
Mohammadi,” TSNM, or Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic laws,” has also 
been a thorn in the government’s side.74 Its founder and leader, Sufi Mohammad, was 
jailed in 200275 and the organization was banned, but its new leader Maulana 
Fazalullah has expanded the group’s activities.76 TSNM, another pro-Taliban group, 
took control of several towns and villages in the NWFP, including the picturesque 
valley of Swat, and tried to implement strict shariah law. The group stems from the 
Malakand agency in FATA but has alliances all over the Frontier region. Al-Qaeda’s 
surviving leadership, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman-al-Zawahiri, is also 
suspected by the U.S. to be hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas, which makes it even 
more critical in the “war on terror.”77 Several other smaller anti-government groups 
have emerged, but details on many of these organizations are unclear. 
The youth movement is dismantling the tribal structure that has existed for 
centuries. They are aiming to replace the jirgas with Islamic courts that impose a 
much stricter version of the shariah, although in many parts of Waziristan, jirgas are 
still held. Elders, which once commanded power and the tribes’ respects, are being 
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condemned for supporting the Pakistani military.78 The home-grown youth movement 
has employed the same rhetoric that was used by their predecessors to rally tribes 
against the British. However, armed with modern weaponry and skilled fighters, the 
violence entrepreneurs in the current conflict have refused to back down or enter into 
agreements with the Government of Pakistan.   
The groups probably most impacted in this conflict are the elders, children 
and women in the tribes. The citizens of FATA maintained good relations with 
Pakistan’s government as long as they were allowed their autonomy, and most tribes 
pledged allegiance to the country while condemning anti-Pakistan/Afghan 
propaganda; the tribes remained in relative peace until the late 1970s upheaval in 
Afghanistan.79 However, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the Pakistan 
Army’s subsequent incursion into the tribal areas caused deep resentment among the 
locals. The tribes initially sympathized with the Taliban, who were also ethnically 
Pashtun, and harbored many who fled Afghanistan in the wake of the U.S. attacks. 
But with militant activity growing, the “Talibanization” of FATA has becoming a 
threat to the traditional tribal societal structure. Existing tribal customs that have 
existed for centuries in these areas are being undermined by the young militants who 
are also from the tribes but are vying to establish a system of hierarchy in which they 
have the ultimate power. The tribesmen who have not sided with the Taliban, 
especially in Waziristan, have been forced to side with violence entrepreneurs for fear 
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of losing their own lives. They have received little support from the government, 
whose activities in the region are mainly limited to military affairs. The Government 
of Pakistan says it is difficult to distinguish the militants from peaceful tribesmen 
because the former hail from the tribes themselves. Many locals have been forced to 
leave their homes for other areas, creating a throng of internally displaced people in 
the tribal belt. 
There are several other key actors involved in this conflict. A top player is the 
U.S., which has a heavily vested interest in the region because of its rebuilding efforts 
in Afghanistan. One of the U.S.’ top foreign policy goals is to support “geostrategic” 
interests in Pakistan and combat the global threat of terrorism. To achieve this, the 
U.S. has ramped up aid to Pakistan and is pressuring the country to produce results 
against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. To continue developing Afghanistan, U.S. 
lawmakers have considered that it is in the U.S. interest to support the Pakistani 
government and prevent militants from gaining a further foothold in FATA. 
According to writer Tariq Gilani, “Pakistan has become the U.S.’ most trusted ally in 
the global war on terrorism… There is a perception that the renewed friendship is 
being driven solely by America’s need for Pakistani cooperation in the ‘War on 
Terrorism’ and is dependent upon the continued presence and leadership of President 
Pervez Musharraf.”80 In a recent address, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan are a direct 
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threat to U.S. and Western interests and that it will take between three to five years to 
completely quell the insurgency.81  
The government and army of Pakistan are also chief players in this conflict. 
Since its inception, Pakistan had maintained relatively peaceful relations with FATA 
tribes. But amid growing violence in its northwest border and pressure from 
Washington to prevent Al-Qaeda from spreading, the Pakistani government deployed 
its military to FATA for the first time ever in 2002 to fight against an alliance 
between foreign Taliban supporters who fled Afghanistan in the wake of the U.S. 
invasion and their allies in the tribes. In recent years, the government has deployed 
more than 90,000 troops in the tribal areas.82 Seeing that the military buildup only 
fuelled resentment and caused widespread flight of people from their homes, the 
government reached accords with the violence entrepreneurs in April 2004 in South 
Waziristan and on 5 September 2006 in North Waziristan.83  
Thus far, the Government of Pakistan has had an inconsistent strategy and 
incoherent policies in dealing with the conflict in the tribal areas. It tried negotiating 
with violence entrepreneurs on several occasions, but when that failed, they resent the 
army to the tribal areas again, only to withdraw it a few months later and start talks 
again. This process has been repeated several times since 2002 and even the new 
government that was installed in February 2008 has had little luck in devising a 
consistent strategy.  
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The Government of Pakistan is facing a monumental challenge in curbing the 
spread of Taliban ideologies in the country, which has spread beyond the FATA to 
the NWFP. As a local journalist said, “Talibanization is seeping out of the tribal areas 
and spreading like a jungle fire.”84 Even in the capital of Islamabad, the rise of 
conservative mullahs, or religious leaders, has threatened to create disorder among 
rival parties. The new government, which came into power in February 2008, has 
vowed to negotiate with the militants, but attempts at talks have failed and rebellions 
in FATA continue to flourish. 
Another party in this conflict is Afghanistan. President Karzai’s regime has 
criticized Pakistan for not doing enough to stop cross-border attacks that are being 
launched against the NATO forces and the Afghan army by militants in Pakistan. On 
the other hand, Musharraf has accused the Afghan government for “not doing 
anything to fight terrorism,” letting militants flee into Pakistan and “losing the fight 
against Taliban.”85  
Other players in this conflict include sellers/purchasers of weapons, including 
non-state actors such as criminal gangs, and tribal landlords and businessmen, many 
of whom buy weapons in bulk, as well as law-enforcement agents. Women have also 
been impacted heavily by this conflict, as Chapter Four will show. 
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From Past to Present 
“History is certainly being made in this corridor 
(Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier) still and I am sure 
a great deal more history is going to be made there in 
the near future – perhaps in a rather unpleasant way…” 
Arnold Toynbee, English Historian, 196186 
 
 The British provided some of the most accurate and detailed accounts of the 
tribes, yet contemporary authors have argued that their sketches were tainted with 
stereotypes. This chapter will analyze the people of Waziristan and greater FATA as 
viewed through the eyes of the British, and shed light on contemporary events against 
the backdrop of colonial history. 
I. Noble Savages87 
 FATA tribes had a tumultuous, love-hate relationship with the British. Images 
of the brute tribesmen were portrayed next to romantic descriptions of the unchartered 
tribal territories and their handsome yet vicious warrior tribesmen. In reality, the 
region was the scene of the greatest military conflicts of the closing years of the Raj.88 
Even as late as the 1930s, there were as many British troops in Waziristan as in the 
rest of the Indian subcontinent.89 
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Figure 3– Sketch Map of Waziristan, 1958 
 
Source: Caroe, The Pathans, 1958. 
D.C. Murray, posted to Miranshah in North Waziristan in 1945, described it:  
Hardly a day passed but telegraph wires were cut, bridges blown up, convoys 
and camps sniped and murder committed… The place was a savage desert of 
gravel plains and cruel mountains… A parched and sparsely-populated tract of 
inhospitable mountain desert… whose inhabitants were always armed to the 
teeth, ready to commit or suffer outrage, bold, brave, cruel and dangerous, 
ruled by the laws of the Koran and the blood feud.90 
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Table 2– Historical Timeline 
Years Event 
1839-42 First Anglo-Afghan war 
1849 British capture Peshawar 
1857 Mutiny in tribal areas 
1872  British introduce the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) 
1878-82 Second Anglo-Afghan war 
1893-96 Creation of the Durand Line 
1895 North and South Waziristan Agencies established 
1897-98 Frontier War/The Great Tribal Uprising 
1901 North-West Frontier Province Created 
1914-18 World War I 
1919 Third Anglo-Afghan war; Afghanistan creates its first Constitution 
1939-45 World War II 
1945 Sir Olaf Caroe becomes last governor of NWFP 
1947 Partition; Pakistan and India created 
1979 Soviet Union invades Afghanistan 
1989 Soviet Union withdraws from Afghanistan; Beginning of Afghan civil war 
1990 Onward Taliban consolidate their power 
1991 Collapse of the Soviet Union 




Pakistan’s tribal areas have been subject to many empires, “perhaps more 
invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia, or indeed the 
world.”91 The present territory of the NWFP was first formed as part of the Ghaznivid 
Dynasty in 977; in 1179, Muhammad of Ghor captured the area and was subsequently 
overthrown by the Mongols in 1221. However, several areas in the tribal territories 
remained independent and the Mongols did not succeed in crossing the Indus River to 
overtake India.92 The nature of the Mongols’ dealings with the tribe is not clear, and 
they remained on hostile terms with Indian emperors for most of their reign. 
According to historians, the Frontier tribes never accepted any sole central authority; 
in fact, each acceptance of the ruling authority – whether it was the Mughals or the 
British – was only for strategic, self-serving purposes. “No empire of which we have 
any record has ever succeeded in making subjects of the tribes of Waziristan,” said 
Sir Olaf Caroe, Britain’s last governor of the NWFP and a key actor in the final years 
of the Empire.  
 The British arrived in Peshawar, now the capital of the NWFP, in 1849, 
ending the unsuccessful and ruthless Sikh rule started by Maharaja Ranjit Singh and 
beginning their long, difficult journey with the Pashtuns. Dealing with the Pashtuns 
was not an easy task.  
The conditions were extraordinarily difficult. In the first place there was no 
tradition of any really firm order even in the plains, at least since Mughal 
times; in the neighbouring highlands there had never been any control. 
Secondly there was no exact limit, such as that provided by a stable State up 
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to which, and no further, the new authority could run. Thirdly, and this was 
certainly not adequately appreciated at the time, the Pathans were from almost 
every point of view, ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical, different even 
from the Muslims of Punjab.93  
 
An array of unknown Pashtun tribes were spread across unexplored terrain; to 
control them fully would have required even more military might than even that 
possessed by current governments, according to historian Hugh Beattie.94 
Additionally, there was no set frontier boundary between the British territory and the 
Afghan Kingdom of Dost Muhammad Khan; in fact, the tribal territory beyond 
British control was known as ghairilaqa, un-administered territory (a title which still 
applies today), or Yaghistan, the land of rebels,95 where the people were “armed to 
the teeth and were the most notorious raiders and plunderers in history.”96 
Afghanistan claimed authority over the passages between the two lands.97  
For the first twenty years, the British implemented the “Close Border Policy,” 
a policy of non-interference which involved minimal intervention in the tribal areas. 
Many in the Raj believed that the Indus River formed the northwest frontier of the 
Empire, hence deeming it unnecessary to directly deal with the tribes. Furthermore, 
they eliminated custom duties on the Frontier to encourage the tribes to trade in 
India.98 Even so, Caroe estimated that there were at least eleven military operations in 
the twenty years after the Indian Mutiny of 1855-57, and twelve expeditions from 
1877 to 1881 (See Appendix 1).  
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Following the second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-80, the British realized they 
needed direct relations with the tribes to enhance their own security measures in the 
main passes that led to Afghanistan.99 Hence, the 1890s marked the beginning of the 
“Forward Policy” and the end of “masterly inactivity.”100 Although the British had 
been successful in many cases in dealing with the tribes through military might, they 
realized that expeditions alone would not produce any lasting results and that there 
was a need for a more conciliatory policy.101 The shift in policy divided British 
lawmakers, with one side believing that the least possible advances into the Frontier 
would be helpful to the British and the other side thinking that an active policy in the 
tribal areas would prevent any Russian onslaught. Eventually, the two sides 
reconciled and decided that the best way to stop the steady advance of Russia towards 
British India was by building a friendly, united Afghanistan to serve as a buffer state.  
Attempts were made throughout the British rule to form a closer alliance with 
the Amir of Afghanistan by gift-giving and providing ammunition.102 The 
relationship between the British and Afghan leaders was erratic, and the problem of 
tribal control continued well until the British departed India. Settlement of tribal 
affairs in Waziristan was probably the most “thorny problem” for British 
lawmakers.103 
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To secure their legitimacy, the British started a system of allowances 
(muwajib). Under these written agreements, maliks from every tribe were paid an 
allowance in return for a guarantee of border security, control of raiders and general 
good behavior. The controversial allowance system came under fire as being a form 
of blackmail and for creating rifts in an egalitarian society by giving corrupt maliks 
stipends but many British strategists and Caroe defended it, saying that since the 
tribes were not direct subjects of the British Empire or their legal codes, this was a 
way to keep them from raiding the more settled tribes in the plains.104 “Making 
particular tribes responsible for the security of particular routes into the hills (in 
exchange for allowances), known by the British as ‘pass responsibility,’ was an 
important frontier management technique.”105 If they did not keep their promises, the 
British punished the tribes with economic blockades, prisoners/hostages, property 
seizure and military expeditions. Additionally, the British often took advantage of 
intra-tribal rivalry to pit one tribe against the other. 
In 1872, the British introduced the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), which 
authorized tribes to settle their disputes through the traditional jirga. For the British, it 
was also important to distinguish the boundary between their territory and the 
Afghans, which led to the creation of the Durand Line, named after Sir Mortimer 
Durand who was in charge of the delineation project. “The dissenting members 
recognized that the Durand Agreement had introduced a new factor into the already 
                                                 
104 Caroe, The Pathans, 349.  
105 Beattie, Imperial Frontier, 34. 
 37
vexed cauldron of border politics, but held that in course of time it would tend to a 
peaceful solution of the frontier problem.”106  
Following the creation of the Durand Line in 1893, the frontier tribal belt 
came under direct control of the British. While the demarcation process was begun by 
Sir Mortimer Durand, he was posted to Iran soon after and did not stay in India to see 
its completion. It took three years for the British to establish a full north-south border, 
thanks to interruptions by the Amir of Afghanistan and difficulties in accessing the 
tribal areas. The difficult of the demarcation process, which took several years, is well 
expressed in a narrative by Sir Mortimer Durand:  
Once I said to him (Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan): ‘After all, Amir 
Sahib, if there is so little population and wealth in the country you describe 
(the tribal areas), what good will it do you?’ His answer was one word. He 
turned upon me slowly with a very steady look into my eyes, and said: ‘Nam,’ 
(honour). On such points he was inflexible.107 
 
  “There was no longer a no-man’s-land of uncertain extent, and both 
authorities could now think and act with greater precision.”108 Despite the delineation, 
an “ethnological monstrosity,”109 the British were careful not to impose their own 
administrative laws on the tribes. For the most part, they left tribal customs and rights 
intact.110 Nevertheless, “all this was regarded as a deliberate menace to a long-
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cherished independence,”111 resulting in the war of 1897 that started in a Wazir 
village. After all, it was the first time that the Pashtun tribes were divided between 
Afghanistan and the Raj. “Demarcation dictated by political expediency and not by 
scientific considerations was naturally to culminate in an uprising of the resentful 
tribes inhabiting the disputed area.”112 The border was formed without tribal 
consultation and divided Pashtun tribes between Afghanistan and Britain; for 
example, the border cut the Mohmand tribal area into two separate parts and to this 
day, many tribes refuse to acknowledge the division. 
 Some historians contend that the Durand Line and the agreement between the 
Amir and the British to divide the region was not particularly helpful to the latter.  
Frontier history, since 1893, shows that this agreement has not only increased 
the responsibilities of the Government of India, but has also increased the 
chances of collision with the tribes and of war with the amir. The new 
boundary was not based upon sound topographical data, for, during the 
process of demarcation, it was discovered that certain places, marked on the 
Durand map, did not exist on the actual ground. Many ethnic absurdities were 
perpetrated, such as the handing over to the amir of the Birmal tract of 
Waziristan, peopled by Derwesh Khel Waziris, the majority of whom were 
included within the British sphere of influence.113  
 
British frontier policy had two objectives: One to secure the best possible 
position from which to repel an overland attack by a European power (France, at first, 
then Russia); second to secure life and property against tribal raiders and outlaws 
sheltered by them.114 According to G.C.S. Curtis, who served as political agent in the 
South Waziristan Agency from 1943 to 1946, the first imperial object was achieved 
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but there was only partial success for the second domestic goal, mainly because the 
tribes had never known what it was like to be governed. “Here, if anywhere in the 
world, was to be found the dictatorship of the proletariat expressed, not in the tyranny 
of the few, but in the license of many… Such society bred a turbulent and predatory 
attitude to life which made it an uncomfortable neighbour.”115 It was difficult to 
control arms smuggling from Afghanistan and to appease the tribes in every way, and 
hence made full conquest of the tribes difficult. 
According to historian Hugh Beattie, British imperial policy had four 
influences. Firstly, tribal territory was part of a critical frontier that, for the Raj, 
served as the boundary between them and the Russians; secondly, decisions had to be 
made about how much the government would spend in administrative, financial and 
military resources; thirdly, frontier policy had an ideological dimension, which meant 
that policies were impacted by personal beliefs; fourthly, the British had to resolve 
sociological ideas about how tribes “worked.”116 
Caroe likened the Mahsud to a “wolf… more purposeful, more united and 
more dangerous” and the Wazir to a “panther… slier, sleeker, and has more grace.”117 
The Mahsuds were a constant sore point in the British scheme, indiscriminately 
carrying out raids, killings and kidnappings. The Mahsuds of central Waziristan were 
particularly rebellious, followed by the Wazirs.118 “Of all the Pathan tribes up and 
down the North-West Frontier, the Mahsuds were without question the most 
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intransigent.”119 G.C.S Curtis wrote that Mahsuds murdered more British officers 
than any other tribe.120 “The Mahsud and other tribesmen were convinced of the 
superiority of their society to the only two societies of which they had any 
knowledge, Afghanistan and India.”121 Afghan interference made matters even worse. 
The Government of Afghanistan provided fodder to the tribes for continual agitation, 
including financial and emotional support, against the British, and gave asylum to 
outlaws and bandits.122 These “Afghan allowance holders” were the chief stirrers of 
rebellions.123 Another group that often agitated the British were the mullahs, religious 
leaders, whose importance will be discussed in further detail later on in this chapter.  
Many scholars have argued that the tribes could not stand rule by non-
Muslims, but Caroe argued that it was not religious impulse but the urge “to resist 
subjection and to preserve their own peculiar way of life”124 that drove Mahsuds to 
such actions. In fact, according to Caroe, a tribesman was a Mahsud first and then a 
Muslim,125 a notion that has been argued by many contemporary scholars. 
Over time, the British decided that the best way to deal with the tribes was 
through indirect rule; imposing centralized administration on them would only invite 
resistance.126 A Political Agent, aided by a large cabinet of British and local 
tribesmen, was posted in each agency to serve as a “go-between;” he was an advisor 
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to the tribes, the army and the administration and prevented feuds and raiding.127 
Many British Political Agents carried hopes of introducing “civilization” to the tribal 
areas, and thought that one day the tribes would recognize the graciousness of the 
British Empire and be drawn to modernization, like the rest of the Indian empire. But 
even when relations between the two parties were amicable, Pashtuns never aspired to 
be like the British. “Although they sometimes formed good relationships with 
individual officers, it appears that they did not particularly admire the model of 
civilisation the British offered with its emphasis on status, hierarchy and obedience to 
authority.”128 In contrast, they prefered more to “be men like our fathers before us.”129 
Under Lord Curzon, viceroy of India, who took a keen interest in tribal affairs, 
the Frontier Corps were formed in 1900.130 With fighters from every tribe, the scouts 
were responsible for the security of the Frontier. At the same time, the North and 
South Waziristan militias, or, as one historian dubs them, “poachers turned game-
keepers,” were created for these agencies, which were considered to be the core of the 
Frontier problem.131 The militia was controlled by the Political Agent and the 
Agency’s Chief Commissioner. Young recruits joined the corps for money and, to 
some extent, their love of fighting.132 Nevertheless, of all the tribes, the Wazirs 
avoided service with the British, and the few Mahsuds who joined it were known for 
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desertion and rebellion.133 The Frontier Corps continues to be an important tool of the 
Pakistani army, but despite their connections to the tribes, the Corps has met with 
little success in rooting out the terrorists that Pakistan and U.S. governments are after.  
Even though they were not successful in integrating the tribes into the rest of 
the British Empire and uprisings continued to erupt, the Raj maintained a certain 
degree of control over the tribes and put considerable effort into learning about the 
Frontier. Only top British civil servants were posted to the frontier because of the 
difficulty of the post. Frontier officers were required to learn Pashto and local 
customs, and had to cultivate good relationships with influential men to get to know 
their district.134 In contrast, many in the Pakistan and the U.S. governments that are 
involved in the conflict today are largely ignorant of the customs and traditions of the 
Pashtun people, which has hindered the “war on terror.” The British placed heavy 
emphasis on languages, but in the current crisis, there is a significant dearth of 
language and culture experts. Even before the beginning of the “war on terror,” a U.S. 
Senate subcommittee held a hearing on the “crisis in Federal Language capabilities” 
and acknowledged the shortfalls in language skills in U.S. peacekeeping missions.135  
Upon partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, a plebiscite was held on the 
frontier and the tribes voted in favor of joining Pakistan. The North-West Frontier 
was heavily contested between the Indian Congress Party and the Muslim League, led 
by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. “Both Congress and League recognized its importance in 
                                                 
133 Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan, 28.  
134 Beattie, Imperial Frontier, 107. 
135 U.S. Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Hearings: 
The State of Foreign Language Capabilities in National Security and the Federal Government, 106th 
Cong., 2nd session., 2000, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2000_hr/hr_091400.html. 
 43
their policies; it was the acutest of all bones of contention between them.”136 As the 
next section will show, the idea of “The Great Game” kept this region’s profile high 
even during and after partition.  
II. The Great Game 
 Coined by British officer Arthur Connolly around 1840 and later popularized 
by Rudyard Kipling in his book Kim, the “Great Game” described the nineteenth-
century contest for mastery in Asia.137 It described the struggle between Russia and 
Britain for the dominance of central Asia. Lord Curzon, the last viceroy of India, 
called it the “grand chessboard” on which the game for domination of the world was 
played.138 It was not just a political but also an economic contest.  
India, a prized possession in the British colonial empire, was carefully 
guarded by the British against one of its most powerful foes – Russia. “The British 
looked upon the Russian advance in Central Asia with apprehension principally 
because of their interests in India.”139  
The tribal areas, situated between Afghanistan and India, were considered 
critical to the security of the rest of the Raj and to prevent an onslaught of the Russian 
Empire, which many British believed was bent on conquering the world and to drive 
the British out of India. “They (the tribes) are in a very special sense the door-keepers 
of the gates of India,”140 wrote Caroe, a strategist of the Great Game. This was the 
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“entrance where there may be more immediate trouble, because the people are much 
more difficult and it is possible for fifth column and other organizations to stir up 
trouble there rather than further south.”141 Hence, it was important to secure the 
allegiance of the tribes not just for the defense of India, but also as a barrier against 
untrustworthy Afghanistan, part of the “ring fence” of the British Empire, a series of 
buffers circling from Burma to Persia.142 As Caroe said, Afghanistan was “a place 
which has to be watched if the peace of Asia is to be preserved.”143 The Great Game 
was a “clandestine war of wits and bribery and occasional military pressure as both 
powers kept each other at a respectful distance by maintaining Afghanistan as a 
buffer state between them.”144 As the British stated in a report, “The ultimate aim of 
our North-West Frontier policy is the security of India.”145 This obsession with the 
Great Game was what led the British to adopt the “Forward Policy” in its tribal 
agencies. 
 The Great Game continued even after the British left the subcontinent. In fact, 
it grew even more complicated, with the advent of air power, which deemed the Raj’s 
outer rings useless, regional unrest and the increasing involvement of the U.S.146 
Russia took over Central Asia and eventually roped itself into a protracted war in 
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Afghanistan, in which Pakistan’s tribal areas played an important role, and for which 
Pakistan is now paying a heavy price.  
Caroe warned that Afghanistan and the remote Pathan borderlands of what is 
today Pakistan formed a political fault zone of global significance. He 
anticipated the resilience of Islam in the face of communism and secularizing 
ideologies… The Great Game continues to drive the dynamic of global power 
and strategic competition in Asia today and presumably tomorrow.147 
 
 The U.S. undoubtedly has become involved in the “New” Great Game, and 
the Pashtun tribes continue to be in the spotlight. The U.S.’ first foray into the region 
was during the Cold War, when it funded the mujahideen to fight against the Soviet 
Union. Today, the focus is on the “war on terrorism” and American policymakers 
have realized that to win this war, it will be important to gain the support of the 
Pakistani tribes, as well as the government and the general public, hence the generous 
flow of money to the country. Caroe expressed great cynicism about American 
involvement in his days, when the U.S. opposed colonial rule in South Asia.148 
“Caroe suggested that those in America who spoke the loudest about the moral 
urgency of India’s independence sought in actuality a ‘quid pro quo for land lease in 
the form of air and sea bases and markets for the sale of goods.’”149  
While Caroe recognized the need for American partnership, he feared they 
had wrong ideas about Asian politics. “America professes to be certain that the Indian 
knot has only to be untied by a process of academic liberalism: she does not know 
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how complex is the pattern, or realise the danger of unweaving what is woven.”150 
They would have to refine their thinking to play an effective position in the Great 
Game, he warned. 
 China is the new entrant into the Great Game. With its booming economy, a 
strong army and increasing ties with South Asian countries, China has taken center 
stage in world affairs. Caroe and his colleagues worried that China’s advancement 
southward might break India’s northern barriers.151 China and India have fought a 
war over a disputed region on the Himalayan border, and have had several skirmishes 
along their borders. The two countries currently are trying to build and expand their 
trade relations, although India’s nuclear capability continues to irk China, which is 
investing heavily in projects in Pakistan as well as cementing its ties with the 
government of India.  
 The future of the Great Game is unclear, as several competing forces strive for 
dominance. One of Caroe’s predictions is coming true today: a divided and distracted 
India would shake global security and become an easy prey to power-hungry states.152 
This thesis will not go into the argument of whether the partition caused a regional 
divide. However, given the current circumstances, it is important to note that 
continued instability and ethnic cleavages in Pakistan, which is now at the center of 
the Great Game, could well breed ground for entrance of foreign military powers that 
could not only break the country, but impact the global state of terrorism. After the 
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partition, Caroe envisioned a united Pakistan as the eastern anchor in a “military 
crescent” of Islamic states allied against the Soviet Union.153 While Pakistan did help 
arm and finance the Afghans against the Soviet Union, how its future pans out in the 
Great Game remains to be seen.  
 Journalist Ahmed Rashid postulates that the new Great Game is the “battle for 
the vast oil and gas riches of landlocked Central Asia,” in which Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Iran, Russia, Central Asian countries, Turkey and the U.S. play key roles.154 
Figure 4 – British India’s Outer Buffer Ring 
 
 
Source: Brobst, The Future of the Great Game, 2005. 
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III. God’s Soldiers 
 Afghanistan has always been important for India when it comes to protecting 
itself externally. “Afghanistan and the intervening area had been from the earliest 
time an integral part of Indian history. Inability to regulate his relationship with the 
master of the Afghan area, or to fortify the border satisfactorily, had often in the past 
brought sorrow to many an Indian ruler (like the Mughals and the Marathas).”155  
Since its inception, Pakistan has had an unsteady relationship with 
Afghanistan because of the Frontier border dispute. “They (the Pashtun) are one 
people, the Frontier itself being merely an expedient creation of this century.”156 So 
when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, it came as no surprise that the 
tribes and the Government of Pakistan financially, militarily, physically and 
emotionally supported the mujahideen’s jihad (holy war) against the invaders, the 
former to fight the infidels and the latter to ensure a friendly government came to 
power. The tribes in Pakistan’s northwest frontier played an essential role in 
harboring and training mujahideen warriors.  
Madrassahs, funded generously by Saudis, sprang up along the frontier to 
educate and train the youth that were harbored in Pakistan. Madrassahs had always 
existed in Pakistan and provided education to poor families who could not afford to 
send their children to public schools. But in the 1980s, the curriculum of many such 
institutions change to a more radical teaching of the Qu’ran, which further promoted 
the ideology of the mujahideen. Ahmed Rashid argues that the military government 
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of Zia ul Haq funded madrassahs precisely to increase radical Islamic education and 
to create more Mujahideen recruits. “In 1971, there were only 900 madrassahs in 
Pakistan, but by the end of the Zia era in 1988 there were 8,000 madrassahs and 
25,000 unregistered ones, educating over half a million students.” 157 
The U.S. funneled arms to Pakistan’s highly-secretive Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) agency to strengthen their own position in the Cold War. The funds 
from all sides were exorbitant. Soviet Union pumped $45 billion into Afghanistan to 
subdue the mujahideen; the U.S. funneled $4-5 billion between 1980 and 1992 to the 
mujahideen, who received more than $10 billion in aid from all over the world, 
mostly in the form of modern weaponry.158 
Following the end of the Afghan-Soviet war in 1989, ideological differences 
between mujahideen groups resulted in a civil war, which eventually led to the rise of 
the Taliban.159 There was no shortage of arms or fighters for this Pashtun group led 
by Mullah Muhammad Omer. Galvanizing the people under the banner of Islam and 
reviving Pashtun nationalism, the Taliban climbed to power after a brutal civil war. 
“They were to inspire a new extremist form of fundamentalism across Pakistan and 
Central Asia, which refused to compromise with traditional Islamic values, social 
structures, or existing state systems.”160  
The Taliban’s training grounds were the refugee camps and madrassahs of 
Peshawar and Quetta.  
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Many of them had been born in Pakistan refugee camps, educated in Pakistani 
madrassahs and had learnt their fighting skills from Mujaheddin parties based 
in Pakistan. As such the younger Taliban barely knew their own country or 
history, but from their madrassahs they learnt about the ideal Islamic society 
created by the Prophet Mohammed 1,400 years ago and this is what they 
wanted to emulate.161  
  
 Pakistan, which initially supported the less radical Hezb-e-Islami (Party of 
Islam) led by Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, changed their support in favor of the Taliban 
when they realized Hikmetyar was not making any headway.  
Afghanistan’s jihad rallied Pakistani youth in Baluchistan and the NWFP, 
many of whom joined the Taliban movement themselves. Given Pakistan’s staunch 
support of the Taliban, there was a free flow of movement in the already-porous 
border. Although the U.S. government officially denied support to the Taliban, they 
did little to oppose their policies. With Unocal competing for a stake in a possible 
South Asia natural gas pipeline that would connect the resource-rich Central Asian 
markets to the world and bypass Russia, there was initially little public condemnation 
of the Taliban. “The Clinton administration was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban, as 
they were in line with Washington’s anti-Iran policy and were important for the 
success of any southern pipeline from Central Asia that would avoid Iran.”162 It was 
only in the late 1990s when Taliban’s atrocities worsened that the U.S. government 
openly condemned them. Meanwhile, Taliban sympathizers in the Pakistani 
government kept the relationship between the two strong, even though the former was 
clearly going on its own path, separate from Pakistan’s dictates.  
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Two decades of war and cross-border movements created economic and 
political ties between Afghan Taliban and Pakistan’s Pashtun groups. Many Taliban 
leaders had extensive networks in Pakistan but the Pakistan government paid little or 
no attention to these ties. Most of the focus during the 1980s and 1990s was on 
defeating the Soviets and installing a friendly regime that then General and President 
Zia ul Haq assumed would make at least Pakistan’s western border safe so the 
government could fully concentrate on securing its eastern border with India.163 “The 
Taliban fostered Pashtun nationalism, albeit of an Islamic character and it began to 
affect Pakistani Pashtuns... On both sides, Pashtun tribes are slipping towards 
fundamentalism and becoming increasingly implicated in drug trafficking.”164 Today, 
the Taliban have infiltrated the Pashtun community in such a way that it is difficult to 
distinguish them from the crowd. Afghanistan’s Taliban movement and its exiled 
fighters have inspired new militants from Pashtun groups to wage jihad in Pakistan 
against the government and its western allies, and to instill a more rigid interpretation 
of the Islamic shariah law.   
The Taliban’s rule was characterized by brutal violence both toward the locals 
and international organizations, a strict interpretation of the Islamic shariah law and 
suppression of women. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. and its 
ally, the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance, attacked Taliban-controlled Afghanistan 
when they refused to hand over bin Laden. Many Taliban soldiers, which included 
not just Afghans, but also Chechens, Uzbeks, Chinese and other central Asians, found 
                                                 
163 Ibid., 185. 
164 Ibid., 187.  
 52
safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where the elders harbored them under the 
Pukhtunwali code of melmastia (hospitality). The Taliban also shared the same 
Pashtun heritage as the tribes on Pakistan’s side of the border. There was also 
widespread sympathy for these “holy warriors,” which were seen as fighting for Islam 
and deep resentment against the “infidel” Western forces, with U.S. as the chief 
aggressor. Pakistan not only served as the center of refuge for the exiled Taliban, but 
it became the breeding group for militant activities, which continue to rage on today.  
Ahmed Rashid had rightly predicted that Pakistan’s foreign policy toward 
Afghanistan would one day impact its own national security, domestic politics and 
create an Islamic fundamentalist backlash.165 Pakistan, what Ahmed dubs as “an 
already fragile state beset by an identity crisis,” has been hit by a wave of sectarian 
violence and suicide bombings.166   
As early as the late 1990s, Pashtun areas like Waziristan were experiencing 
harsh shariah laws, a stricter dress code for women and an even more repressive way 
of life. Even the then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott predicted in 
1999: “With the emergence of the Taliban there is growing reason to fear that militant 
extremism, obscurantism and sectarianism will infect surrounding countries. None of 
these countries has more to lose than Pakistan if ‘Talibanization’ was to spread 
further.”167  
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For many in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the U.S.’ abandonment of Afghanistan 
following Soviet withdrawal was seen as a sign of desertion. Many in the region 
asserted that the U.S. only cared about its own strategic interest and left when it 
ended, furthering the legacy of the “Kalashnikov culture” and drugs. Thus far, neither 
the U.S. nor Pakistan has had much luck in curbing the currents of violence in the 
tribal areas, and many academics predict this is only the start of bigger problems. 
Akbar Ahmed predicted, “If the Americans crossed into Waziristan and occupied it, 
what was happening in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad in 2003 would seem like a 
picnic.”168  
The Pakistani government has denied direct involvement of U.S. forces in 
Waziristan but recent news reports by the Pakistani media, the BBC and The New 
York Times say that the U.S. Air Force has been carrying out air strikes in the 
northwest frontier region of Pakistan. News reports have cited sources stating that 
these strikes are believed to have been conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) using Predator drones.169 Officials speaking on the basis of anonymity have 
told The New York Times that strikes have been launched from Afghanistan. In June 
2008, American air strikes killed 11 Pakistani paramilitary soldiers; U.S. defense 
officials said they were trying to retaliate against Taliban fighters who crossed into 
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Afghanistan from Pakistan to attack U.S. troops, but incorrect grid coordinates led 
them to hit Pakistani forces instead.170 
IV. The Refugee Problem 
 Pakistan currently hosts more than 2 million refugees and asylum-seekers, the 
largest number in the world; most of these refugees are Afghans.171 Years of constant 
war, famine, drought and lack of employment opportunities drove throngs of Afghans 
to Pakistan, which was preferred over Iran because of its Sunni majority. Afghanistan 
ranked as the world’s worst humanitarian disaster zone in 2001 and Afghans make up 
the largest number of illegal migrant workers in Europe.172 Even though some 
Afghans have returned to their country, there is still a large refugee population, 
specifically in Pakistan’s northwest Pashtun areas.  
 There were three major periods of Afghan exodus: during the 1979-1989 
Soviet-Afghan war, during the Najibullah and Taliban governments in the 1990s, and 
from 2000-2001, when the country was hit by severe droughts and later attacked by 
the U.S.173 By the time the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989, there were an estimated 
3.3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan and 2.2 million in Iran, becoming the single 
largest concentration of refugees in the world.174 Many of the refugee camps in which 
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the Afghans stayed, especially in the NWFP, have now become their permanent 
dwelling.  
 In 2007, Afghanistan had the largest number of repatriates, with 374,000 
people returning to their country, but it also continued to be the leading country of 
origin for refugees.175 As of the end of 2007, there were almost 3.1 million Afghan 
refugees or people in a refugee-like situation, comprising 27 percent of the global 
refugee population. About 96 percent of them were located in Iran and Pakistan. 
There were 2.033 million refugees and in refugee-like situations in Pakistan at the end 
of 2007, 886,700 of whom were assisted by the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).176 However, that number could possibly be 
underestimated, given that many Afghans – specifically those part of the Taliban 
regime – who crossed the border into Pashtun areas and settled with tribes in FATA 
were most likely not included. There were also many unregistered camps during the 
refugee exodus that are not manned by the Government of Pakistan or UNHCR. 
Many of these camps were in areas where government had little or no authority, such 
as Waziristan.  
 The pace of repatriation for Afghan refugees accelerated between 2002 and 
2004, after the Taliban were replaced by the government of President Hamid Karzai. 
But the speed of repatriation has slowed down since then because of security 
concerns specifically in the southern and eastern part of the country; additionally, 
many Afghans have been living outside their country for more than 20 years and 
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more than 50 percent were born overseas, making it difficult for them to return to a 
country they do not know, according to the UNHCR.177 
 As of 2006, of the refugees in Pakistani camps, two out of three were below 
age 25; in non-urban areas, 54 percent of refugees were men.178 There was one camp 
in North Waziristan agency; the number of camps in South Waziristan was unknown. 
Akbar Ahmed estimated that during his term as Political Agent of the South 
Waziristan Agency in 1980, there was a refugee to local ratio of 1:6 there, and of 1:2 
in the North Waziristan Agency.179 Many of these Afghans living in “refugee-like 
situations” were not provided support by the UNHCR.  
Many in the government claimed that dealing with such a large influx of 
refugees and playing the part of the host country was not an easy task for the 
Pakistani government. While some international agencies have criticized the 
government for not doing enough to take care of the refugees, Pakistani officials 
refuted the criticism, stating that the administration had treated them generously and 
paid through its own coffers despite aid money.180 The importance of refugees is 
important to understand because one, it shows what a deep impact a conflict in one 
country (Afghanistan) can have on its neighbors (chiefly Pakistan). Secondly, the 
consistent flow of refugees for nearly 30 years has weakened the pace of economic 
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growth in the Frontier and burdened an already staggering regional economy.181 
Thirdly, many Taliban fighters slipped into Pakistan after the U.S. invaded 
Afghanistan in late 2001. Most likely, these Taliban fighters were not counted in the 
UNHCR surveys. It was a natural sanctuary; the Taliban were mostly Pashtun, an 
ethnic group straddling the border, and included many Pakistanis, mostly from the 
tribal areas, and of these especially Wazirs, the chief tribe of Waziristan.182 Fourthly, 
and most importantly, given the demographics of the refugees and lack of resources 
and livelihoods, many children and youth from these camps were swept up by the 
currents of militancy.  
The core of the Taliban grew from the Pashtun refugee camps, mostly in 
Pakistan, where a modified and selectively interpreted version of Wahhabist 
Islam influenced some madrassa students (talib) to adopt an ultraconservative 
approach to social issues and politics. Theological students fighting for 
professed rights and freedoms are not a new phenomenon in the region, and 
these talibs, now formally calling themselves the Taliban, presented 
themselves as righteous religious students on the march for peace.183 
 
One Pakistani author wrote: “Jihad was the only skill taught to the refugee 
children. Very often, it was the best, if not the only, employment available to young 
Afghans. The jihad industry benefited Pakistan’s establishment, Afghan warlords and 
a section of the Pakhtoon elite, including drug barons, smugglers and Maulanas184… 
War is indeed a heroic thing when it is fought in someone else’s territory.”185 
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V. New Wine in Old Bottles:186 Pakistan’s Conflict 
 Since 1947, the tribes, for the most part, maintained neutral relations with the 
Government of Pakistan. Many Pashtuns, including those from Waziristan, left their 
homes to fight in what they considered was the Kashmir “jihad” against Indians. 
Nevertheless, calls for an independent Pashtunistan, were never fully muted. With 
some support from Afghanistan, pro-Pashtunistan maliks organized small tribal 
invasions of Pakistani territory, but these were trivial and died down without much 
fervor. The Pashtun population grew rapidly; while the Pakistani government built 
more schools and migration of Pashtun labors and businessmen to metropolitan cities 
increased, poverty also grew. Chapter Three will analyze the economic data in this 
region in more detail. Some tribes opted out of what they believed were 
“modernizing” influences, such as schools or roads.187 
The army was largely absent in the Frontier, which was entrusted to the 
Frontier Corps, a federal paramilitary force assembled from local tribesmen and 
designed to help local law enforcement.188 With the exception of small-scale 
operations in the tribal areas, the Pakistani government stayed out of Waziristan and 
the army never entered the area. That changed in 2002, when then Commander-in-
Chief and President, Pervez Musharraf chose to side with the U.S. in its “war on 
terror” despite opposition by many Pakistanis who believed the war in the tribal areas 
was not theirs to fight. Pressured by Washington, Musharraf deployed the Pakistani 
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military to FATA to fight an alliance between foreign and local militants from the 
Wazir and Mahsud tribes. For the U.S., wrapped up in a war in Afghanistan that had 
spilled into Pakistan, it was imperative to curb Al-Qaeda’s activities and find Osama 
bin Laden, who was heard to be taking refuge in the mountainous regions of 
Pakistan’s tribal areas. “The Pakistani army, in an explicit show of support from 
American troops across the border in Afghanistan, was now at the international 
border in the Agency for the first time in history, but attempted to keep a low 
profile… American troops had found themselves having to take a crash course in the 
Great Game.”189  
By that time, by bribing local elders and finding refuge under the Pukhtunwali 
code of hospitality, foreign militants were able to fight the government and gain 
support from many tribes. However, these new militants infringed upon the tribal 
system by establishing their own governance structures and even beheading tribal 
elders who did not support them. This led many tribal elders, who initially supported 
the Taliban, to turn against them and flee to safer areas.  
In the spring of 2004, American troops launched “Operation Mountain Storm” 
along the Afghan frontier after a “high value target” was spotted in the South 
Waziristan Agency. However, the Pakistani army, which was aiding U.S. troops, 
retreated when more than 100 Pakistani personnel were killed or kidnapped and the 
fighting spread to the North Waziristan Agency.190 Seeing that the military buildup 
only fuelled resentment, the government reached accords with the tribes in April 2004 
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in South Waziristan and on 5 September 2006 in North Waziristan.191 But the peace 
agreement did not last long. The Government of Pakistan tried to give incentives to 
tribes to combat foreign militants, but that strategy did not yield any results either; in 
fact, tribesmen who were not part of the militant groups were afraid of siding with the 
government in fear of a militant backlash. The government described the conflict as 
local tribes recoiling against Al-Qaeda-type militants.192  
The government of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, which came into 
office in March 2008 as a coalition between led by the Pakistan’s People’s Party 
(PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), promised to initiate talks with the 
militants and a brief ceasefire was accorded by the Tehrik-i-Taliban in April 2008. 
But their leader, Baitullah Mehsud, soon suspended talks with authorities, resuming 
attacks against the government.193 To appease the militants, the Pakistani army 
swapped prisoners with the pro-Taliban groups in South Waziristan in exchange for 
security personnel who had been kidnapped. Furthermore, it cut back the number of 
troops in the tribal areas, a move criticized by NATO and the U.S.194  
The Government of Pakistan’s military involvement in North and South 
Waziristan Agencies continues to change, but as of this writing, no peace accord had 
been reached and the Government of Pakistan had not declared a clear victory in the 
war against Taliban groups. U.S. lawmakers have publicly complained that the 
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Pakistani government is not doing enough to combat the militants and stop cross-
border raids into Afghanistan.195 As the next chapter will discuss, U.S. aid to Pakistan 
has increased considerably after the start of the “war on terror” in 2001. Most of that 
aid has been directed toward the Pakistani army, but the U.S. government has also 
pledged to help develop more economic and educational reforms.  
U.S. involvement has not been favorably looked upon in the tribal areas. As 
the historical analysis has shown, not only are the tribes staunchly mindful of their 
independence, they have been hesitant to accept authority of any central government, 
even that of Pakistan. For many young militants, the U.S. is not only encroaching on 
tribal sovereignty but also trying to conquer and subdue the Islamic world. This 
thinking is not new, as the analysis of the British colonial era has showed. As in the 
past, many militants, whatever their real grievances and motives may be, have 
portrayed the conflict in terms of Islam versus the infidels. According to the 
International Crisis Group, “The problem for Pakistan was that Washington had 
demonized Bin Laden to such an extent that he had become a hero for many Muslims, 
particularly in Pakistan.”196 The government is facing a monumental challenge in 
curbing the spread of Taliban ideologies in the country, which has spread beyond the 
FATA to NWFP. As a local journalist said, “Talibanization is seeping out of the tribal 
areas and spreading like a jungle fire.”197 
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VI. Role of Religious Leaders 
 In a decentralized, unrestricted system like the Pashtun tribal structure, it is 
difficult for any one person to emerge as the sole leader. In addition, Islam does not 
have any formal priesthood, which often makes religious leadership questionable. The 
mullahs in the tribal areas are mainly responsible for giving children religious 
education, leading the prayers in the mosque and acting as a spiritual guide. 
Nevertheless, religious leaders, or mullahs, often hold influence and have been known 
to rile the tribes against “infidels.” “Leaders have always tended to be holy men, 
appealing to their tribesmen to fight for Islam… Even where conflict has been 
politically inspired, religion has never been far behind as a force for justification and 
sanction.”198 In turn, claiming religious authority made one a political leader 
automatically.199 For the strict Sunni Pashtun, an attack on Islam is an attack on 
Pukhtunwali that can only be revenged by killing the perpetrator.200  
 The mullah’s power was well explained by Theodore Pennell, a Christian 
missionary and doctor who lived among the Afghan tribes in the early twentieth 
century:  
For one thing, knowledge has been almost limited to the priestly class, and in 
a village where the mullahs are almost the only men who can lay claim to 
anything more than the most rudimentary learning it is only natural that they 
should have the people of the village entirely in their control. Then, the 
Afghan is a Mohamedan to the backbone, and prides himself on his religious 
zeal, so that the mullah becomes to him the embodiment of what is most 
national and sacred.201 
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 Waziristan was the site of many religious upheavals, both against the British 
and later, the Government of Pakistan.  
As British penetration of tribal territory increased, it is worth drawing 
attention to the fact that its defence tended to be increasingly expressed in 
Islamic terms, seen as jihad and led by religious rather than secular leaders. A 
similar process is observable in many other parts of the Islamic world which 
came under European pressure at this time, for example, in the Caucasus, 
Kurdistan and Somalia.202  
 
Many of these religious leaders, like the Faqir of Ipi, or Mullah Powindah, 
gained political influence and commanded a large following amid the orthodox 
tribes.203 As has been the case historically, the tribes are often easily riled by religious 
rhetoric, which is ingrained in the tenets of Pukhtunwali.   
  “The Pathan is susceptible to Islamic symbols such as ‘jihad’, religious wars, 
and quick to respond to them…”204 However, scholars disagree on the extent of the 
mullahs power of persuasion. Akbar Ahmed argues that mullahs only emerge as 
leaders in time of great crisis, and usually against non-Muslim. Otherwise, his role is 
“humdrum.”205 Nevertheless, history shows there is a trend of religious uprisings, 
with mullahs playing a dominant role, when a foreign power encroaches in tribal 
territory. “The pervasiveness of Islamic belief and the hatred of non-believers make 
intrusion by outsiders into Pushtun territory a dangerous undertaking.”206 The conflict 
today has often been expressed in religious terms. Violence entrepreneurs claim that 
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the Pakistani government, and specifically Musharraf, has wrongly aligned the 
country with Western powers that are allegedly on a mission to destabilize Islam.  
The Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union started as a tribal uprising led by 
clan chiefs and ulema, senior religious scholars.207 But even the role of religious 
leaders has changed. The ulema, according to Ahmed Rashid, rarely challenged 
traditional Afghan structure like the jirga but new Islamicists like the Taliban 
denigrated the centuries-old tribal arrangement and instead pursued a more radical 
political ideology.208 The same game is playing out in Pakistan’s tribal areas, where 
young militants, egged on by the motivation for jihad, are diminishing the importance 
of tribal elders and trying to diminish the tribal values and structure that have 
coexisted with orthodox Islam for centuries. Religion has often been used as a tool to 
give identity to a cause and unite the warring tribes. “The historical idiomatic 
response through which Islamic sentiment expresses itself in times of extreme crisis is 
‘jihad’. The major stimulation is religion.”209 This trend has not changed. When the 
Taliban took over, it was not Pashtun nationalism that necessarily increased sympathy 
toward them, but the idea that they were fighting for Islam against foreign “infidels.” 
In today’s conflict, the same rule applies. Militants have been waving the banner of 
Islam to stir soldiers into what they conceive is foreign domination imposed by 
Pakistan, an Islamic state turned on the wrong path. As Ahmed stated, “The 
emergence of mullahs, pirs and fakirs210 dabbling in politics is a constant 
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phenomenon in the tribal areas. Unchecked, such men may create considerable 
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Chapter Three 
The Political Economy of Conflict 
“When citizens are denied their basic  
human rights, they become radicalized.  
When people are powerless,  
they are easily manipulated.  
This is what worries me the most.” 
Rashid Rehman, Pakistani Human Rights Lawyer212 
 The conflict in Waziristan is a combination of many factors – grievances 
against the government, absence of strong regional institutions, rising drug and arms 
trade and a weak security structure in FATA. But one of the key factors, as Caroe 
argued about past conflicts, and that this thesis will show, is lack of economic 
development in Waziristan and the greater FATA. This chapter will explore the 
economic situation in the region in light of Caroe’s assessments and the impact and 
effectiveness of aid.  
I. Neglected Pakistanis 
 The rapid growth in Pakistan’s economy in the early twenty-first century was 
mainly concentrated in urban centers like Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad and has not 
filtered down to the barren lands of FATA, which remains one of Pakistan’s poorest 
regions, with high poverty and unemployment and underdeveloped infrastructure. As 
an article in The Economist stated, “They (the people of Waziristan) are probably the 
most neglected Pakistanis.”213 While the tribes have rejected what they consider 
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modernizing and Western influences, there is a strong demand for boys’ schools and 
hospitals, one which the Government of Pakistan has overlooked.  
The latest economic data on FATA was compiled by the Government of 
Pakistan in 2000, and there is no reliable current data.214 According to The Crisis 
Group’s estimates, per capita income in FATA was less than half that of the national 
per capita income of $800 in 2006. Sixty percent of people lived below the national 
poverty line and per capita development expenditure was one-third of the national 
average.215 The overall literacy rate was 17.42 percent; the male average was 29.51 
percent and females a mere 3 percent.216 Waziristan had one hospital bed per 6,000 
inhabitants.217 









Primary Schools, total 162,500 3,276 2.02 
              Male  104,900 2,120 2.02 
              Female 57,600 1,156 2.01 
Middle Schools, total 18,400 347 1.88 
              Male 10,300 259 2.51 
              Female 8,100 88 1.08 
High Schools, total 12,600 201 1.60 
              Male 8,000 183 2.28 
              Female 4,600 18 0.39 
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Inter & Degree Colleges, total 853 9 1.06 
              Male 509 9 1.76 
              Female 344 0 0 
Enrollment (by level)    
Primary School, total 20,399,000 266,713 1.30 
              Male 11,720,000 205,749 1.76 
              Female 8,679,000 60,964 0.70 
Middle School, total 4,338,000 40,949 0.94 
              Male 2,631,000 37,158 1.41 
              Female 1,707,000 3,791 0.22 
High School, total 1,795,000 15,166 0.84 
              Male 1,105,000 13,985 1.26 
              Female 690,000 1,181 0.17 
Inter & Degree Colleges, total 791,000 3,007 0.38 
              Male 435,000 3,007 0.69 
              Female 356,000 0 0 
Literacy Ratio (percentage) – 1998 Census    
Total 45.00 17.42  
              Male 56.50 29.51  
              Female 32.60 3.00  
 









Hospitals 876 42 4.8 
Dispensaries 4,635 170 3.7 
Maternity and Child Health Center 856 17 2.0 
Medical Personnel    
Doctors 91,823 408 0.4 
Nurses 37,623 69 0.2 
Lady Health Visitors 5,619 132 2.3 
Beds Strengths    
Total Beds 93,907 1,263 1.3 
Selected Ratios    
Population per Bed 1,495 2,645  
Population per Doctor 1,529 8,819  
 
Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, “Statistical Abstract of F.A.T.A.,” 1999-2000. 
 The main source of income is pastoralism, agriculture and drug trade, the 
activities of which are concentrated in few hands; there is little industrial 
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development, other than an arms factory, but there are few jobs relative to the 
population.218 Major crops grown in FATA are wheat, rice, maize and barley. South 
Waziristan was popular for its dry fruits, which were exported to China, India, 
Afghanistan and markets in the rest of Pakistan, but export activity has stopped 
because of the conflict.219 Cultivable land has become relatively scarce; only seven 
percent of FATA is estimated to be arable. There are natural resources such as 
minerals and coal but they are underexploited.220 Transport and communications 
infrastructure, including roads, is in dismal shape, and, in many areas, predate the 
1947 partition. Many villages do not even have electricity. As BBC News journalist 
Aamer Ahmed Khan stated, “Entering Waziristan feels like travelling back in time. 
The sparsely populated and dramatic barren hills show few signs of having 
encountered modern times. The fortress-like houses that occasionally dot the 
landscape add to that image.”221 
Rent-seeking activities have concentrated power and income into the hands of 
the few at the expense of the rest of the population in FATA. Rent-seeking, which is 
defined as the effort to acquire access to or control over opportunities for earning 
rents, or monopoly profits,222 diverts efforts from improving overall economic 
activity and welfare to inefficient activities, such as lobbying and outright bribery to 
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obtain preferential access to rents or to create rents through policies. It has virtually 
no benefits for the economy or people in general, and only fattens the pocketbooks of 
a few at the expense of many. Despite little or no government regulations in the 
FATA, the barriers to entry are high and those who cannot afford to pay rents cannot 
actively participate in the economy. Protection rackets run by gangs of violence 
entrepreneurs extort money. Additionally, a monopoly on business trade and 
economic activities by the Mahsuds has left Wazirs and other tribes out of the 
scheme. Collier et al. argue that rent-seeking often makes a country more prone to 
conflict, especially where political and social cleavages are already present. Special 
privileges granted to one group create resentment, especially in a society which is 
already economically underdeveloped.  
The relationship between the Political Agent and the maliks is very much a 
patron-client one. For example, the Political Agent is in charge of allocating funds 
and overseeing development projects in FATA. It is a position that presents rent-
seeking opportunities such that a malik can coerce or bribe the Political Agent to 
build a specific road or school in his area rather than another where there might be a 
greater need. Many have criticized the Political Agent for exploiting his position for 
personal enrichment by selective distribution of patronage to maliks, the local elites 
who serve as representatives of their tribes; there is no input from the local population 
or even their parliamentary representatives in development projects.223 The position 
of Political Agent and the system of maliks has come under fire for breeding 
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corruption. It created resentment among tribesmen who were left out of rent-seeking 
schemes; the rhetoric that government is corrupt has also been employed by violence 
entrepreneurs.  
In addition, there is a complex hierarchical system of government leadership 
that exists below the Political Agent. And just like the rest of Pakistan, there is a very 
large government bureaucracy in the NWFP and in the FATA, and there are many 
rent-seeking opportunities that arise in these positions. Most of the rents are generated 
from trade activities, given the scarcity of arable land. It is possible that minerals 
mining and industries also provide opportunities to earn rents but there is little data 
available to verify that analysis. 
Rent-seeking opportunities have also caused income from weapons flow and 
trade of illegal goods to become concentrated in the hands of a few, and it has done 
little to improve the political economy of FATA. Drug trade is concentrated mainly in 
the hands of violence entrepreneurs and drug barons.224 For example, the Taliban in 
Afghanistan generated revenues from the narcotics industry of nearly $8 billion.225  
According to historian Hugh Beattie, Pakistan’s adoption of the “Close Border 
Policy” when it was created and increasing tribal population has contributed to 
growing economic inequality and tension between rich and poor.226 From the 1970s 
onward, the Government of Pakistan pursued a “cautious forward policy” in the tribal 
areas, but the influx of Afghan refugees in subsequent years and growth in drug trade 
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has dented efforts to improve the economy. Families in the tribal areas still live in 
mud houses that are unable to withstand storms, rain and snow, much less military 
bombardments. 
Figure 5– A Damaged Mud House in North Waziristan 
 
 
Source: Reuters, 2007. 
II. The Wild West of Free Trade227 
The British eliminated customs duties on the Frontier to encourage tribes to 
trade with India. Pakistan continued this policy after its creation, and despite debates 
on whether to change customs laws, little has been done to regulate trade. The 
Pakistani government tried to introduce new economic opportunities to integrate the 
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tribes into the rest of the country, but those were only met with mediocre success. It 
did find some success in establishing more schools, but women’s education has 
considerably lagged behind the rest of the country, partially because of government’s 
lack of awareness-increasing activities and partially because of tribes’ resistance.  
A private industrial sector is virtually non-existent. Up until a few years ago, 
there was little impetus to improve the industrial sector, both from the Government of 
Pakistan as well as the tribes. In Waziristan, a silk and synthetic weaving industry 
developed but it is unknown how many people participate in it. Some Pashtuns, 
especially from the Mahsud tribe, have migrated to the Middle East or other Pakistani 
cities for work or established trade in the southern port city of Karachi and send 
remittances to their families. There are no surveys about how much that contributes to 
the regional economy. Trade in the FATA Agencies revolves mainly around the 
informal market in the form of trading and selling of luxury goods and arms. 
While critics have placed the bulk of the blame for lack of development 
schemes on the Government of Pakistan, it is important to acknowledge that 
implementing economic schemes in the tribal areas is not easy.228 Although each tribe 
differs from the other, some have not welcomed improvement plans, especially when 
it comes to women’s education and have been hesitant to “modernize.” Scholar and 
former Political Agent Akbar Ahmed wrote, “Indifference, even ill-concealed 
contempt, greets book learning as a deviation from the Waziristan model of behavior. 
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The tribesman’s question about the schoolteacher, ‘What worlds has he conquered?”, 
is a general indictment of education.”229 
Nevertheless, the Government of Pakistan was presented with numerous 
opportunities to make headway into the tribal agencies. While it did build more 
schools, it put little effort in FATA compared to the rest of the country. Even a 
government document acknowledges this neglect: “Since the independence of 
Pakistan, FATA has not been accorded the same priority in terms of the development 
process being undertaken in other parts of the country. Consequently quality of life in 
FATA is far behind when compared with the NWFP or the national figures.”230 The 
only time that the government took serious interest in this region was during the 
Soviet-Afghan war when the military regime of Zia ul Haq let arms and drug trade 
flourish. In the 1990s, Benazir Bhutto’s government tried to improve roads, but 
mainly to win political favor. Following the spotlight that was once again fixed on the 
region following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Pakistani government 
promised more resources for building schools, universities, infrastructure and 
industry.  
To meet Millennium Development Goals, the Pakistan Ministry of Commerce 
estimates that it needs to create at least 100,000 jobs in FATA. The military has 
announced development projects worth millions of dollars for building roads, schools, 
and hospitals. Musharraf had said the government will spend $16.5 million on 
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development as well as $150 million in a five-year economic initiative to integrate 
FATA into the national economy. The government has pledged a $2 billion, nine-year 
sustainable development plan.231 To encourage industry, the government identified 
potential for exporting sporting and hunting arms manufactured in FATA, stating that 
the demand stands at 600,000 arms annually and could potentially generate revenues 
of $100 million per year.232 It also plans to exploit and develop the marble industry in 
Mohmand, Khyber, Bajaur and Kurram agencies, but has not specified whether these 
will be public or private-sector initiatives. The Government of Pakistan has said that 
7,000 million tons of good quality marble is found in FATA; currently, only 1 million 
tons per year is excavated, hence there is potential for more mining activities. New 
factories are also planned to block, cut and refine the marble.233  
The FATA Development Authority (FDA) was established as a semi-
autonomous organization in September 2006 “to plan and execute sustainable 
development projects.”234 By the middle of 2008, the Government of Pakistan had 
reportedly pledged $1 billion for the program, with an additional $750 million 
contribution by the U.S.235 The organization has been mandated to develop 
“Reconstruction Opportunity Zones” with modern infrastructure and facilities by 
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December 2008 for an estimated cost of $14.4 million (roughly Rs. 1 billion).236  The 
government also plans to spend $86,450 (Rs. 6 million) to study township 
development in various agencies, and $29,000 (Rs. 2 million) to study potential 
tourism opportunities. In early 2008, the Government of Pakistan also commissioned 
FDA to develop a dam in the North Waziristan Agency. The Dande Dam is expected 
to cost $6.4 million (Rs. 442,664 million). FDA is receiving support from the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID), as will be discussed in more detail 
later on in this chapter. The projects for FATA sound promising, but it remains to be 
seen how viable and successful they will be.  
In the meantime, the conflict brewing in the region has destabilized an 
already-unstable economy. Traders in South Waziristan reported that dry fruit trade 
virtually collapsed in 2004 because of Pakistani military incursions. This resulted in 
Chinese buyers staying out of the region because of security.237 Trade of fresh fruits 
from Wana, capital of South Waziristan Agency, dried up when the conflict began 
and has not resumed.  
III. Political Economy and Conflict 
Caroe strongly believed that development measures would keep the tribes 
economically and socially occupied, and eventually, would help them integrate into 
the rest of the country. He felt that the Sandeman system238 implemented in 
Baluchistan was met with success, but the British failed in increasing education and 
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in general providing infrastructure such as roads, forts and cantonments in 
Waziristan.  
Indirect rule does not work in the absence of support, and if necessary 
protection, which must be afforded to the tribal authority expected to obtain 
the results desired by the government. The fiat that there should be maliks was 
not enough. In Baluchistan, the Sandeman system had been accompanied by 
the construction of cantonments, forts and roads, making force available at 
tactical points for the support of the tribal authority… But the Government of 
India, more interested in the immediate aim of frontier demarcation arising out 
of the Durand Agreement, turned a deaf ear.239  
 
Pakistan continued the British policy of non-interference, causing the tribes to 
remain on the periphery of the rest of Pakistan economically, politically and socially. 
Given economic underdevelopment, rent-seeking opportunities and the level of 
corruption, it is no surprise that the tribes, especially the youth, are increasingly being 
driven into the arms of the militants. Many unemployed young men in the region 
have especially been prone to recruitment by pro-Taliban groups and have joined 
militant groups as a way of gaining livelihoods or enhancing their social importance 
and power.  
Many journalists, scholars and academics have argued that it is not poverty or 
joblessness that has driven men to militancy, but rather the idea that they are waging a 
jihad for Islam. While this is certainly a rhetoric that has been repeated proudly by 
militant leaders, and may certainly be one of the causes, this thesis argues that it is 
mainly used as a grievance that disguises the bigger agenda of gaining power, money 
and personal enrichment. Case studies of the Faqir of Ipi and Mullah Powindah have 
shown that motives go well beyond religious rhetoric. They also hide personal 
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agendas and quest for individual power in a society that is easily assuaged and 
manipulated by Islamic rhetoric. It is true that many of the top militant leaders are not 
products of poverty-stricken families and many have obtained higher education. But 
for the poor tribesman who does not cultivate poppy fields, does not have any arable 
land, cannot afford to move to another area of Pakistan to earn a living, or transfer 
abroad, economic deprivation does play a role in his quest to join the militancy. If 
pro-Taliban groups offer them incentives, they are easily recruited. “In the tribal 
areas, where there is no other employment to speak of, the influx of the militants’ 
money was just one more means by which they gained influence.”240 In cases where 
families cannot afford to migrate to other cities, violence entrepreneurs kidnap and 
coerce young men into joining their rebellion.  
Fostering economic development, especially from the bottom up, can help 
curb conflict. As this thesis has argued, for some poverty-stricken citizens, joining a 
rebel group ensures they have food, shelter and clothing and a chance for a leadership 
position, which they probably would not have otherwise. As one tribesman in North 
Waziristan, Khalid Wazir, said to a journalist, “Development…will undermine the 
authority of radical Islam by demonstrating to the tribesmen that they needn’t rely 
blindly on mullahs for their subsistence.”241 
Where income is low and declining, or unevenly distributed, young people 
tend to be easily recruited by “entrepreneurs of violence” because their opportunity 
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cost is low, creating hostility and lack of trust toward the government.242 The 
opportunity costs for joining a rebellion are low when per capita income is low and 
there is no prospect for economic growth,243 as is the case in Waziristan. As Collier 
has stated, “Low income means poverty, and low growth means hopelessness. Young 
men, who are the recruits for rebel armies, come pretty cheap in an environment of 
hopeless poverty. Life itself is cheap, and joining a rebel movement gives these men a 
small chance of riches.”244 Taliban fighters reportedly earn as much as $300, a 
considerable sum for many jobless tribesmen.245 “If the reality of daily existence is 
otherwise awful, the chances of success do not have to be very high to be alluring… 
The prospect of death is not so much worse than the prospect of life in poverty.”246 
“In the absence of economic development, neither good political institutions, 
nor ethnic and religious homogeneity, nor high military spending provide significant 
defenses against large-scale violence.”247 The poor economic situation has created 
grievances among citizens, and rebel leaders seize on the opportunity to exploit these 
grievances, whether they really care about improving conditions across societies or 
not.  
Many of the Taliban fighters who crossed the border into Waziristan and other 
agencies initially satisfied the tribes by giving them allowances, separate from the 
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government, and by promising them a better livelihood. In time, they were able to 
cement their foothold enough to overcome tribal elders. As a Christian Science 
Monitor journalist reported, “Like international analysts, they (the youth of 
Waziristan) agree on the basics: After the 2001 fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
foreign terrorists came to FATA to exploit its weaknesses. A 17 percent literacy rate, 
together with a failing agricultural economy, has offered a large pool of disgruntled, 
uneducated recruits.”248  
The government of Pakistan’s first tactic was to employ a military strategy, 
but when that failed, they also tried to influence tribal elders by paying them bounties 
to turn in pro-Taliban militants. But because of distrust of the government and fear of 
militant killings, people have little incentive to fight rebel leaders or to provide 
information to the government against them.  
Illiteracy further breeds mistrust and violence. For example, a Pakistani 
government-sponsored polio vaccination campaign was boycotted in the Bajaur 
Agency when mullahs and militant leaders spread the rumor that the polio campaign 
was a Western conspiracy heralded by the U.S. to sterilize Muslim children; parents 
of some 24,000 children refused the polio vaccine.249  
IV. USAID: The “Human Face” of U.S. Foreign Policy250 
 Musharraf’s decision to join the U.S.’ “war on terror” propelled Pakistan to 
among the top of U.S. aid recipients. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the 
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focus of U.S. aid was changed from economic and social development to 
counterterrorism and “transformational diplomacy,” which placed more emphasis on 
U.S. security and democracy building as major goals of foreign aid.251 As a “front 
line” state in the “war on terror,” Pakistan became a prime beneficiary for the first 
time since Zia ul Haq’s regime was funded to support the mujahideen against the 
Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. All the economic sanctions that were 
placed on Pakistan following its nuclear tests and military coup were lifted. In 
October 2001, President George W. Bush signed an act “exempting Pakistan from 
coup-related sanctions through FY2002, providing waiver authority on the sanctions 
through FY2003 and granting an exemption from foreign aid prohibitions related to 
the country’s loan defaults.”252 The administration also rescheduled $379 million of 
Pakistan’s $2.7 billion debt to the U.S. so that it could continue receiving aid.253 
Average annual U.S. aid to Pakistan between 2002 and 2006 was estimated to 
be $665 million, up drastically from $3.4 million between 2000 and 2001.254 
Afghanistan and Pakistan combined receive 84 percent of the aid allocated to Central 
and South Asia.255 President Bush has committed to provide at least $600 million in 
economic and security assistance to Pakistan through 2009.256 Most U.S. assistance 
programs directly or indirectly serve U.S. counterterrorism goals, a report issued for 
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the Congress stated. The increase in aid has made the U.S. the largest bilateral aid 
donor to Pakistan.257 
Table 5– U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, 2004-2008 
(thousands of dollars) 




Child Survival and Health 25,600 21,00 22,757 22,385 39,800 
Development Assistance 49,400 29,000 26,990 95,327 18,000 
Economic Support Funds 200,000 297,600 296,595 283,677 382,900 
Foreign Military Financing 74,560 298,800 297,000 297,000 300,000 
International Military Education 
and Training 
1,384 1,885 2,037 1,992 2,000 
International Narcotics Control and 
Law Enforcement 
31,500 32,150 34,970 24,000 32,000 
Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, 
De-mining and Related Programs 
4,930 7,951 8,585 9,997 10,300 
Totals 187,374 688,386 688,934 734,358 785,000 
 
Source: Congressional Research Service, U.S. Foreign Aid to East and South Asia: Selected 
Recipients, August 22, 2007. 
 
Primary Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
 
NOTE: 
FY2008 figures constitute the amount of aid the administration has requested.    
 U.S. assistance in FATA has three goals: improve security, stability and 
economic opportunity.258 In 2008, about $90 million in assistance was set aside for 
this region with the aim of improving education, health facilities, roads and boosting 
economic growth with the help of local communities. The U.S. has reportedly 
contributed $38 million specifically for programs to bring health care and education 
to tribal areas since 2002.259  
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 USAID closed its offices in 1995 in Pakistan because of the row over 
Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons. The mission was restarted by the U.S. 
government in Islamabad in 2002,260 and USAID activities in Pakistan have increased 
considerably since then. USAID also works closely with the Governments of 
Baluchistan and Sindh provinces to help develop the educational sector. In those 
areas, it has been met with some success, unlike FATA, where USAID activities have 
thus far been limited.  
Table 6– Breakdown of USAID Funding Since 2002 
(millions of dollars) 
Sector Funding 
Emergence Economic Assistance 1,600 
Education 256 
Health 169 
Earthquake and Reconstruction 106 
FATA 105 
Democracy and Governance 84 
Economic Growth 70 
Program Support 9 




In FATA, “USAID’s objectives include enhancing the legitimacy and writ of the 
Government of Pakistan in FATA; improving economic and social conditions for 
local communities; and supporting sustainable development.”261 Between 2002 and 
2007, six percent of USAID’s total funds for Pakistan were allocated toward 
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FATA.262 From 2002 to 2006, USAID provided $449 million for education, health, 
economic growth and good governance. USAID also provided $67 million in disaster 
relief following the 2005 earthquakes in Pakistan and has committed $200 million for 
long-term care. According to USAID, it is building 130 schools in FATA along with 
the Government of Japan.263 Some of USAID’s major commitments in FATA 
include: 
- April 2008: A $90 million project to improve education in Pakistan; including 
FATA.264 
- March 2008: As part of the three-year, $17.9 million “Pakistan Safe Drinking 
Water and Hygiene Promotion Project,” 20 local NGOs received grants to aid 
in improving water and sanitation in ten districts and two FATA agencies.265 
- March 2008: A $20 million project to improve mother and health care, 
renovate health facilities, train skilled health workers, increase access to clean 
drinking water and prevent the spread of infectious diseases.266 
- October 2007: Scholarships to 22 students from FATA were given out as part 
of USAID-funded Khushhali Bank Scholarship Program.267 
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- September 2007: Commitment to provide $750 million over five years to 
support FATA development and Pakistan’s “Sustainable Development 
Plan.”268 The U.S. provided $105 million in 2007 alone for development in 
the tribal agencies.269 
- April 2007: First ever “Child Health Day” marked in Khyber Agency as part 
of the $11.5-million USAID-funded health program.270 
Table 7– USAID FATA Development Program 
(millions of dollars) 
Project  Goals Cost  
Capacity Building Program · Strengthen capacity of institutions to plan, 
implement and monitor programs. 
· Improve coordination between security and 
development organizations. 
· Improve communications. 
· Increase the ability of civil society to 
contribute to development.  
43 
Capacity Building Support · Build confidence and trust between the 
Government of Pakistan and tribal 
communities.  
· Increase media and communication outreach.  
45 
Livelihood  · Generate employment. 
· Develop skills. 
· Increase vocational training.  
· Promote agricultural, livestock and trade-
enhancing programs. 
· Develop infrastructure.  
· Target group: Between 14 and 30 years of age. 
300 
Education · Improve service delivery for basic education 
and adult literacy.  
· Support adult literacy centers. 
· Create community-level school management 
committees.  
· Improve quality and sustainability of teacher 
education and student performance. 
79.4 
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· Rehabilitate schools and construct and furnish 
new facilities.* 
· Improve water and environment sanitation in 
girls’ schools.  
Health  · Improve service delivery for primary health 
care. 
· Extend Pakistan’s “Initiative for Mothers and 
Newborns.” 
· Deliver a package for children under the age 
of five covering immunization and treatment for 
respiratory infection, diarrhea, newborn care 
and nutrition. 
· Promote Pakistan’s “Clean Drinking Water” 
program.** 
· Prevent and control infectious diseases. 
· Promote awareness about HIV and AIDS. 
23.5 
Economic Growth · Assist sustainable, long-term economic 
growth.  
· Expand micro-credit opportunities.*** 
· Provide support to private sector groups in the 
marble and granite, gems and jewelry, and 
furniture sectors to improve production and 
increase profits. 
· Build transport infrastructure. 
16 
 
Source: USAID FATA Development Program, January – March 2008.  
 
NOTE: 
*This program is being implemented in five agencies: Bajaur, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, Orakzai 
and three frontier regions: Peshawar, Bannu and Kohat. 
**The project is limited to the following six agencies: Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, Khyber, North 
Waziristan and Kurram, and six frontier regions.  
***The expansion is focused on five agencies: Khyber, Kurram, Bajaur, Mohmand and Orakzai.  
 As the data shows, USAID’s mission in Pakistan has expanded and is 
expected to continue growing. The agency has outlined specific goals for 
development, but the big question is, who are the beneficiaries of this aid and is it 
working? 
V. Success or Failure? 
 USAID has outlined significant reforms for FATA such as those discussed 
above, which have the potential to help catalyze positive change in the dismal 
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economic situation in FATA, and Waziristan.271 Sustainable growth and development 
will also hinge on conducive change from within the tribal areas and the Government 
of Pakistan, which needs to work to empower its citizens. But firstly, these projects 
have yet to materialize. Many of the projects are multi-year plans, and thus far, 
USAID and even Government of Pakistan’s aid workers have not been able to 
penetrate many parts of the tribal areas because of the conflict.  
Secondly, these projects have been overshadowed by military operations. 
Against the backdrop of military incursions, many tribes may be quick to reject 
development schemes. The Government of Pakistan has little access to these areas, 
where even the local Frontier Scouts have been attacked by militants. In such a 
scenario, it is difficult to work with locals and in many cases, the unpredictable 
security situation just does not make development plans feasible. As Husain Haqqani, 
Pakistan’s current ambassador to the U.S., told a reporter in 2004, “There have been 
social programs since the nineteen-seventies in the tribal areas… I don’t think there 
are any empirical data to suggest that after your house has been intrusively searched 
you say, ‘Oh, those are the good guys! They put the water fountain in my village.’”272 
Many academics and reporters argue that aid driven by political purposes will not 
work because trust, a key factor, will be missing, even if its goals are promising. It is 
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what Pakistani political activist Feroz Ahmed dubbed as “buying political allegiance 
with hard currency.”273 
 Thirdly, there is little mention as to how these projects will be implemented. 
Getting access to some tribal agencies, like North Waziristan and South Waziristan, is 
not simple. The agencies are dotted with militants, bandits, mullahs and leaders of 
madrassahs who vehemently oppose what they deem “modernization,” which really 
means encroaching on their authority. Even the Pakistani army has difficulty 
penetrating some cities in the Waziristan agencies, where the bulk of fighting is 
concentrated.  
 Fourthly, the bureaucracy in the Government of Pakistan and FATA is also a 
hindrance to USAID’s work. First of all, the Government of Pakistan has to approve 
the projects, then it must go through the NWFP’s provincial administration, after 
which it trickles down into the hands of the Political Agent who, as has been 
established, could be involved in rent-seeking opportunities that steer money away 
from the poor to the elite. Finally, the tribal jirga must approve any development 
projects before they can be implemented in an agency. Hence, a project can easily get 
sidetracked even before it has started.  
 Fifth, accountability has been a major issue; U.S. aid has come under criticism 
for not only being ineffective but also because most of it is diverted to unknown uses. 
A journalist from UK’s The Guardian reported, “Every month the Pakistani military 
submits expense claims averaging $80m to the US embassy in Islamabad. No receipts 
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are provided, and the money is paid directly into the Ministry of Finance.”274 There is 
little record of how the cash money that is given to the Pakistan military for fighting 
rebels in the tribal areas is allocated, according to The Guardian report. 
 Sixth, there is also skepticism in the U.S. government about the large sums of 
money that are allocated to overhead costs in the form of consulting and contractor 
fees. USAID estimates overhead costs are around 30 percent of total aid.275 “A 
regular complaint about USAid-funded contractors is that too much of the money that 
could be spent building a school or training teachers in the target country is instead 
spent on salaries of well-qualified experts and on overheads such as their offices in 
the US or Europe.”276 However, Collier’s research had found that technical assistance 
that involved hiring consultants helped break key constraints in post-conflict 
situations and that it was the most effective type of aid during the first few years of 
the post-conflict period.277 Indeed, USAID expertise has proven to be effective in 
some projects implemented in the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan. However, it is 
difficult to gauge the effectiveness of foreign consultants in NWFP because thus far, 
there has been little work done in the FATA region. How effective foreign expertise 
will be remains to be seen.  
Additionally, many politicians argue that some consultants are not in tune 
with reality. For example, schools built in FATA have to be earthquake-proof by U.S. 
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standards.278 In a region where resources are few and far between to begin with, and 
outsiders are not welcomed by the locals, such costs are many times unnecessary. It 
might be more effective to quickly and more efficiently build a school that is not 
earthquake-proof than not build one at all because of lengthy construction 
requirements. Since FATA has largely been closed off to foreigners for centuries, 
there are not many experts familiar with the terrain and nature of the tribes. Local 
experts are hard to find because of lack of education and expertise. To help develop 
the economic infrastructure in the FATA, foreign consultants will need to work 
closely with locals to instill a balance between external and internal expertise. 
A government report found that U.S. aid to Pakistan has not been met with 
success. “The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist 
threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA… No comprehensive plan for 
meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated 
by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003).”279 Goals are not clearly 
defined and there are no specifics as to how the planned projects will be carried out in 
FATA where the security situation is volatile. In such a scenario, it is worth 
pondering the effectiveness of aid.  
 The benefits and consequences of aid, as well as thoughts for future goals, 
will be discussed in the conclusion. But thus far, tangible results in the tribal areas 
have been few and far between, as the U.S. Government Accounting Office has 
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acknowledged, despite the seemingly impressive goals outlined by the U.S. and 
Pakistani governments. As one BBC News journalist stated, “The fact remains that the 
billions of dollars directed at winning hearts and minds and creating opportunities for 
locals seem to be missing their mark.”280 The chief issue is that majority of the money 
is being funneled into the coffers of the Pakistani military, driving away resources 
from the poor. The bureaucratic nature of the Pakistani government also hinders aid 
flow. It is true that tribes have been resistance to many development projects, 
specifically that relate to women’s education schemes, but that does not mean they do 
not want to improve their living standards. The tribes have welcomed roads, 
electricity and communications infrastructure, and schools for boys. Past Members of 
National Assembly (MNAs) representing the tribal regions have requested more of 
such projects, but they have been met with little success.  
VI. The Pakistan Military 
 There is no question that the institution that has benefited the most from the 
surge in U.S. aid is the Pakistani military, the world’s seventh largest standing 
army.281 Initially, about 96 percent of U.S. aid went to the Pakistani military, with 
only 4 percent allocated for economic development of FATA, according to the U.S. 
Department of State.282 Combined with all the development aid being filtered to 
Pakistan through USAID, the U.S. has provided $1.9 billion since 2002 for security 
assistance, meaning to support, equip and train the armed forces of Pakistan. The 
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2008 U.S. Defense Budget allots $75 million to train and equip the paramilitary 
Frontier Corps.283 The U.S. has, since 2001, spent $25 million to equip the Frontier 
Corps, and officials say it could spend more than $400 million in the next several 
years to continue this support, which includes building a training base in the 
NWFP.284 The U.S. Government’s Accountability Office noted that from October 
2001 to June 2007, the U.S. reimbursed Pakistan $5.6 billion in “Coalition Support 
Fund” for military operations in FATA.285 According to one journalist, the money 
was reportedly used to pay for “heavy equipment better suited for a regional conflict 
with India rather than to fight the insurgents in Waziristan.”286 Pakistan’s defense 
budget for 2008-09 is expected to reach $43 million (Rs. 3 billion), more than 15 
percent of the total budget.287 
 Pakistan’s military not only controls the security infrastructure, it has deep 
stakes in the country’s economy as well. The military owns everything from cement 
firms to construction conglomerates to cornflake manufacturers to bakeries.288 Author 
Ayesha Siddiqa put the army’s net worth at more than $20 billion, roughly four times 
                                                 
283 John Barry, Zahid Hussain and Ron Moreau, “The General’s New Mission,” Newsweek, February 
18, 2008, 44.  
284 Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “U.S. Plan Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces in Qaeda 
Battle,” The New York Times, March 2, 2008. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/world/asia/02military.html?pagewanted=1&sq=pentagon%20and
%20waziristan&st=nyt&scp=1. 
285 Anjum Ibrahim, “Why US Matters So Much to Our Politicians and Military,” Business Recorder, 
May 12, 2008. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Pakistani Ministry of Finance, “Budget in Brief,” June 11, 2008. 
http://www.finance.gov.pk/admin/images/budget/budgetbrief.pdf. 
288 Asiamoney, “Pakistan: The Dark Side.” 
 93
the total foreign direct investment into Pakistan in 2006.289 She estimates that more 
than 11 percent of state land is owned by the military, and the combined wealth of the 
leading generals is $7 billion. 
 The military historically served as the country’s protector and unifier in times 
of international crisis, whether it was the Bangladesh secession war, conflict with 
India or support of Afghan mujahideen. But in the last ten years, the military’s 
credibility has been damaged amid opposition against Musharraf, who resigned in 
August 2008. Critics of the military argued that if less U.S. aid got diverted toward 
military resources and more toward rebuilding the economy of the FATA in the 
earlier stages of the “war on terror,” the conflict would not have escalated. As 
journalist Sharif Shuja said, “The Pakistani army, as an institution, has been a major 
obstacle to promoting better governance and development. With defence devouring a 
major portion of the budget, key sectors like health and education have been 
squeezed, and more and more ordinary people continue to fall below the poverty 
line.”290  
 Military aid has had several consequences. First, the high level of support to 
Pakistan has done little to strengthen relations between it and the U.S. Many U.S. 
politicians got agitated with Musharraf for not doing enough to combat terrorism. At 
the same time, the Pakistani government that was elected in February 2008 has 
adopted the strategy of talking with the militants and has pulled out troops from the 
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region, even going as far as to allow rebels to continue imposing shariah law in Swat 
in return for stability. This plan has come under even more criticism than Musharraf’s 
tactics. U.S. politicians feel that there should be more tangible results in the tribal 
areas, given its level of aid and combat support to Pakistan. At the same time, 
Pakistani politicians, including Musharraf, are facing mounting pressure from 
Pakistanis, among which anti-Americanism has grown in the last decade and who feel 
that the war in Waziristan is not theirs to fight. 
 Secondly, the increase in Pakistani military activities has done little to curb 
military activities by the violence entrepreneurs; rather it has given a further cause to 
the violence entrepreneurs to rally about. Collier and his colleagues argue that civil 
war is often followed by an increase in the government’s military budget. Instead of 
curbing the conflict, this usually results in violence entrepreneurs also upping their 
activities in retaliation.  
In Waziristan, militants have only strengthened and expanded their activities 
since 2001 despite the upsurge in Pakistan’s military budget. Military incursions into 
the region have done little to create peace; instead the fighting has led to an increase 
in the number of casualties and displaced civilians, showing that it will take more 
than tanks and bombs to solve the crisis. As a report by Crisis Group stated, “Badly 
planned, poorly conducted military operations are also responsible for the militancy 
in the tribal belt, where the loss of lives and property and displacement of thousands 
of civilians have alienated the population… The use of indiscriminate and excessive 
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force undermined the military’s local standing.”291 An editorial in The Economist 
added, “Seen locally as an invading army, this has inspired fanatical resistance, 
undermined the civil administration in Waziristan, and helped spread Taliban rule 
outside the tribal areas and into NWFP itself.”292  
 Thirdly, U.S. aid has created rifts within the Pakistani military itself. The 
Pakistani army is filled with Cold War-era generals who still hold sympathy for the 
Taliban and what they see as the Islamicist struggle against Western domination. In 
contrast, many leaders are pro-Western, such as Musharraf’s successor in the military, 
Vice-Chief of Army Staff, Ashfaq Kiyani. As a recent Newsweek article stated, “Aid 
alone won't solve the worst weakness of the Pakistani Army: its conservative, old-
school command culture. Kayani can't afford for his fellow officers or the civilian 
public to think he's too close to the Americans... The last thing Kayani needs now is a 
bunch of camouflage-painted American Rambos running around Waziristan.”293  
Additionally, between 20 and 25 percent of the Pakistani military is Pashtun 
who are putting additional pressure on the government to curb military activities in 
FATA.294 This combination of sympathy for the rebels, anti-Americanism and pro-
Westernism means that many military incursions are only half-hearted, giving little 
ground for success.   
 In addition to the military, the conflict in Waziristan and the swarm of U.S. 
aid has divided the Pakistani people as well. Many Pakistanis feel that the U.S. only 
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supports them in times of crisis and abandons them when its work is done, as was the 
case in the Afghan-Soviet war, while others feel that U.S. support is valuable to 
Pakistan’s economy. Pakistanis are also divided about what tactics the Government of 
Pakistan should adopt to solve the crisis in Waziristan. Sympathy toward Islamicists 
and jihadis, along with a more radical ideology, has increased as people view the U.S. 
as the main threat. As an editorial in a Pakistani newspaper said, “Patriotic tribesmen 
who have guarded the western marches for sixty years free of cost have been 
alienated through repeated military operations conducted in pursuit of the USA’s War 
on Terror.”295 U.S. aid givers have not been viewed as benevolent, charitable 
organizations as the administration had hoped. Rather, Pakistanis feel that Americans 
are using their soil to wage their wars. “There is a perception that the renewed 
friendship is being driven solely by America’s need for Pakistani cooperation in the 
‘War on Terrorism,’” which has only increased discontent toward Americans.296 
Many reporters have gone as far as to dub the U.S.’ involvement an “invasion of its 
own kind.”297 On the other hand, many Pakistanis are in favor of the military 
excursions and favor U.S. support to curb extremism.298 
 The U.S. government has complained that its aid has had little tangible results 
in rooting out “terrorists” and/or Al-Qaeda, the leaders of which many U.S. 
policymakers claim are being sheltered in the mountains of Waziristan. Despite their 
economic growth, Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to be regarded among the 
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world’s top Failed States.299 The U.S. government is divided about where and how to 
allocate its resources, and many politicians’ are questioning the large sums of aid to 
Pakistan, including presidential hopefuls Barack Obama and John McCain.   
 The conflict in Waziristan has had detrimental consequences on the lives of 
civilians, especially the elderly, children and women. More than 250,000 internally 
displaced people have thus far moved to cities to escape the fighting. The worsening 
of the security situation in FATA, displacement of people and strengthening of the 
Taliban movement has shown that the U.S. and Pakistani governments have not 
understood the culture, social structures and organization, and the ideology of the 
people. The British put much effort, including people, time and money into 
understanding the norms and values of the tribes and despite their hard work, they 
had little success in maintaining consistent peace in the tribal areas. The U.S. and 
Pakistanis both have a lesson to learn from the mistakes and achievements of the 
British.  
In addition, the stereotypes and misperceptions about the tribes that were 
created during the British continue to this day because of lack of knowledge about 
tribal customs. Until that perception is changed and understood, neither Pakistanis nor 
Americans will be able to make headway into FATA. Until policymakers move 
beyond the “tribal-ness” of FATA ,and really begin understanding and discussing 
how to change ordinary people’s lives by working closely with them to change the 
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mindset and instill more literacy, neither military tactics nor current development 























Consequences of Conflict - Women 
“Women victimized by conflict cannot avail  
themselves of even the basics of human survival,  
and world institutions have failed to protect them  
from the most fundamental human rights violations.” 
Sima Wali, Elizabeth Gould and Patrick Fitzgerald300 
 
 The conflict in Waziristan that started in 2002 has had dire consequences on 
the social order. From the elderly to children, the conflict has had pernicious effects 
on the most powerless groups in society. This thesis will shed light on one of those 
groups – women. The role of women in Waziristan is limited to household chores and 
rearing children and/or livestock. Only the poorest women are involved in activities 
requiring them to leave the house. Yet, women play an important role in the 
acculturation process of children and are vital in maintaining the familial structure. In 
the current conflict, they are both aggressors and victims. 
There is virtually no academic literature specifically about the women of 
Waziristan and even writings about females in FATA are scanty. Therefore, this 
research is important because it sheds light on the plight of women in the historical 
and economic context and furthers the existing literature in this arena. It also 
examines how women are affected by, and contribute to, conflict and war in FATA, a 
topic that has not been analyzed.  
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Some of the most in-depth analysis about Pashtun women is found in the 
works of anthropologists Benedicte Grima and Amineh Ahmed. Both women 
conducted research outside FATA but shed valuable insight about the everyday life of 
Pashtun women which can be applied to the Pashtun community around Pakistan. 
This chapter will assess the role of women in the greater Pashtun society, and analyze 
it in the context of the current conflict.  
I. Statistics 
 The Government of Pakistan estimates that the female population in FATA is 
approximately 1.5 million, or 2.4 percent of the national figure.301 The men to women 
ratio is nearly 1:1. Only 3 percent of women in FATA are literate, compared to the 
national average of 32.6 percent. This does not come as a surprise, since there are 
only 18 high schools for women, and no colleges. Only 4 percent of all women in 
FATA are enrolled in schools. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 
estimated in 2007 that six out of ten girls enrolled in primary schools, but very few 
completed it. In some districts, nine out of ten girls left school after fifth grade.302 
II. Gender Construction 
Gender relations in the tribal areas differ greatly from those in the rest of 
Pakistan. In the male-dominated Waziristan society, women are considered inferior to 
men. They are generally seen as weak and in need of control by men, to the point that 
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in some areas, lack of male relatives is equivalent to being poor.303 A woman’s birth 
is not celebrated, they enjoy few rights, and they do not inherit land or property.304  
Male life begins with the shooting of guns, cries of joy, days of visiting, and 
congratulations and gift bearing to the mother. Female life opens with a sigh, 
or even tears. One cannot generally classify birth as a xadi (joy or festivity), 
because it is most often spoken of as a gham (grief or sadness) in the case of a 
girl’s birth… This gender schism, which begins with birth, grows more 
intense with each stage of growth and development until women’s lives and 
culture are clearly separate from men’s.305  
 
A bride’s price is negotiated to this day and collected when girls are married 
and most of it is kept by the father.306 Women’s main tasks are to cook, collect 
firewood, and look after the house, children and livestock. “Their spare, lean bodies, 
their bare or cheap rubber-shod feet, and their lined faces speak of a physically hard 
life, as one sees them walking along the roads with bundles of firewood on their 
heads.”307 Anthropologist Benedicte Grima, who conducted extensive research on the 
role of emotion among Pashtun women in poor classes, said that a woman earns 
respect and reputation by the amount of hardship and suffering she endures.308 Gham 
and suffering is an integral part of feminine identity. Anthropologist Amineh Ahmed 
argued that Pashtun women’s lives are not totally immersed in gham, but that it is an 
important element in women’s lives. 
In Pakistan, women are slowly entering politics and making headway in 
various fields. However, gender discrimination in FATA is deeper than any other 
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region in Pakistan. Women in Waziristan and in the conservative Pashtun societies 
across the Frontier are considered a symbol of men’s honor. This honor is what 
defines the individual and must be kept by a woman to avoid shaming herself and her 
family.309 Partaking in the company of men, working or going out without purdah310 
are considered dishonorable and shameful. Purdah means veiling and covering 
oneself from other’s eyes. Akbar Ahmed described it as “seclusion, modesty of 
women.”311 As Benedicte Grima wrote, “For many Paxtun women, leaving the house 
without a large outdoor veil is as unheard of as streaking is in the United States. The 
veil is the dominant symbol of the female sphere and all the behavior expected to go 
with it, such as sharm.” Men are generally prohibited from being in the company of 
women who are not close relatives.312 Tor, which involves upholding female honor, is 
just as important of a concept in Pukhtunwali as courage (tora), revenge (badal) and 
hospitality (melmastia).313 “Women are not just victims of violence but are also seen 
as symbols of communal identities and relations between men and women; the proper 
role for women in society has become the terrain on which broader issues of 
differences in economic, political and social power are being fought.”314  
In Waziristan, a woman’s honor has instigated generation-long blood feuds 
and intra-tribal rivalry. “They (honor and shame) are key to social acceptance within, 
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and protection by, the community.”315 A woman’s behavior represents the whole 
family’s honor and reputation. It is an important part of a Pashtun man’s honor; 
hence, a woman must behave so as to preserve her family’s reputation.  
Badal, meaning exchange or reciprocity, is also an important concept in 
Pashtun women’s lives.316 Many women who spent time with Benedicte Grima told 
her that everything in their lives is about badal, whether it is the bride price or honor.  
Like the Pakistani society, there is no separation between the public and 
private sphere in the Pashtun culture. There is little, if no, emphasis on personal 
enrichment, only how one’s behavior impacts family and society. Anthropologist 
Benedicte Grima wrote: 
Every interaction, or social exchange, consists of a public act, an act for which 
the actor is responsible toward an audience, whether it consists of one or one 
hundred people… Unlike Americans, who, in widening the gap between self 
and society, devote much time and energy to promoting and examining the 
personal and individual self through self-analysis, Paxtuns strive to close the 
gap between culture and the individual. Thus, we will see hal wayel (speaking 
of the inner state) spoken of as socially incorrect.317  
 
A Pashtun woman must suppress her inner emotions and has to make all 
behavior conform to society’s norms. Women’s social interaction is limited to social 
gatherings and events. Even these get-togethers are not for leisure; they usually 
involve an event such as a wedding or funeral. Additionally, women generally do not 
have access to public spaces such as parks or restaurants. They are not allowed to 
participate in the jirga or any such institution considered men’s domain.  
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According to Benedicte Grima, Pashtun code requires women to bear their 
hardships with patience and virtue. They cannot run away from their men even if they 
are abusive. Amid economic woes such as poverty and lack of running water and 
electricity, women are also commonly victims of domestic abuse by their husbands 
and in-laws; their life involves constant pressures, first getting married and fetching a 
good price and then bearing children and maintaining the family’s honor.318 They are 
judged on the basis of the hardships they have endured, but also by their morality and 
virtues.319 Women who escape abusive relationships are usually shunned by the 
society. 
Table 8– Conceptualizing Gender 
Men’s Paxto 
                                      Aggression                                      Maintenance of Relations 
                                                                Gherat (honor) 
Individual                     Gun, turban                                       Saritob (being a man) 
                                                                Badal (exchange, revenge) 
Group                           Feud, blood revenge                          Hospitality, granting exile 
 
Women’s Paxto 
                                     Aggression                                       Maintenance of Relations 
                                                                Gherat (honor) 
Individual                     NA                                                     Shame, modesty, tears 
                                                                Badal (exchange, revenge) 
Group                           Upping the ante                                  Gham-xadi (grief-joy), tapos    
                                                                                                 (mandatory visit of inquiry about 
                                                                                                  someone who is ill or suffering), 
                                                                                                  gifts 
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One reporter’s encounter with women in Waziristan summed up their experience: 
Eventually, we passed two old women carrying enormous bundles of wood on 
their heads. They stared at us. We stopped the truck. The women, chuckling, 
climbed into its bed. As we made our way back down the mountain, they 
shrieked at every lurch. “They’ve never ridden in a vehicle before,” my friend 
said, looking in the rearview mirror.320 
 
III. Evolution of Cultural Norms 
 
Women’s role and place in society is often cloaked in religious terms, even 
though many academics have argued that it is simply cultural norms that suppress 
females in Waziristan. For example, Benedicte Grima wrote about how little Pashtun 
women are involved in their marriage and in choosing their partner. According to the 
Islamic shariah, a woman can turn down the marriage partner, but according to rewaj 
(custom), she cannot.321 A second example is that women’s rights in Islam in the case 
of divorce are nonexistent in Pashtun society. Haq mehr (a pre-determined amount of 
money a man grants a woman after divorce) is not granted or required because of the 
honor involved.322 Similarly, Islam allows a woman to divorce her husband but this is 
a “social impossibility” in the Pashtun society.323 The line between Pukhtunwali and 
shariah is often blurred.324 Islamic ideas of segregation have been taken many steps 
further in the Pashtun community in which women’s circulation is controlled.325  
At the same time, Islam is an important facet of women’s lives and it must be 
so understood to comprehend the complexity of the society. As editors of a book 
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compiled by South Asian NGOs wrote: “We have to move beyond the conventional 
rejection of religion as ‘false consciousness,’ because we are often interacting with 
women for whom it is an article of faith, in spite of their experience of its 
oppression.”326 In a society that does not distinguish between cultural norms and 
religion, women accept and fulfill those duties that are expected of and assigned to 
them. Many see religion as their “salvation,” even if they may be oppressed by its 
interpretation.327 One urban women’s group that advocates a sense of religiosity is 
Al-Huda Women’s Movement, which aims to revive Islamic ideas especially among 
urban Pashtun women. The difference between women in such groups and those in 
tribal areas is that the former questions Pashtun practices that are part of rewaj 
(custom), not Islam.  
IV. Women as Aggressors 
 In a society where women have little say about how they live their lives, they 
are expected to side with their husbands and fathers in their decisions. Women often 
forge friendships to promote their family’s political motives and act as mediators for 
family relationships.328 As anthropologist Amineh Ahmed stated, bibiane (a respect 
title for a woman from a wealthy family) work analogously with their husbands’ 
political motives and play a big part in boosting their careers.329 At the same time, 
women have also played a crucial role in impacting their family’s choices and have 
supported many small-scale conflicts that have erupted on the Frontier over the 
                                                 
326 Bhasin, Menon and Khan, eds., Against All Odds, vii. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Grima, The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women, 89. 
329 Ahmed, Sorrow and Joy Among Muslim Women, 12. 
 107
course of history. For example, the Mullah of Waziristan gained prominence in the 
early 1970s in large part because of women who absorbed his conservative ideologies 
through religious gatherings and spread them to their networks as well as to their 
families. A woman’s network constitutes of her own family, her friends, her fellow 
tribeswomen and relatives.  
Pakistan Television (PTV) reports have often pointed to women fighters in the 
FATA region. Women have been used as human shields, and they have fought with 
militants against the army.330 While this may seem unusual, given their traditional 
roles, the norm that a woman must support her husbands’ and sons’ decisions 
explains their role as aggressors in the conflict. Women are also just as prone to 
religious rhetoric as their male counterparts. An example of this would be the siege of 
Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in 2007 by religious militants proclaiming they wanted to 
establish a stricter interpretation of the shariah law in Islamabad; many of the rebels 
in that event were burkha-clad women who stormed a nearby children’s library and 
burned books.  
V. Women as Victims 
 Other agencies and districts, such as Swat, where cultural norms toward 
women were more relaxed than in Waziristan, have felt a severe blow after the 
infiltration of pro-Taliban violence entrepreneurs. In Waziristan agencies, the 
militants have cemented an already-rigid societal structure in which women were 
granted few luxuries. They have imposed Taliban-style shariah law in which women 
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without burkha are subjected to penalties and possibly, beatings. Burkha is a covering 
of women which hides them from head to toe, with only their eyes visible. For many 
women, it symbolizes the separation of men’s and women’s spheres. The Taliban 
made the burkha mandatory for women when they began their ascent to power in 
Afghanistan in the early 1990s.  
Among harsher laws such as closing down female schools, cutting down 
female hospitals, the Taliban in Afghanistan banned women from wearing high heels, 
making a noise with their shoes while they walked or wearing makeup. This has 
specifically impacted poor women who, despite the strict Pukhtunwali code, were still 
forced to leave their home to fetch water, help in agricultural activities or trade. The 
strengthening of the militant movement has made work for women even tougher. In 
addition to making the burkha mandatory, in June 2008, The Tehrik-i-Taliban branch 
in the Mohmand Agency reportedly prohibited women from working in the fields, 
attending marriage ceremonies (a critical xadi event in women’s limited social 
network), and visiting markets and doctors without a male escort.331 They also 
announced a penalty for the male relatives of women who refused to follow purdah.  
 Violence entrepreneurs have also attempted to block aid designated for 
women. In late 2007, local Taliban groups seized and burned thousands of kilograms 
of food destined for pregnant women to a hospital in South Waziristan.332 The food 
was provided for expectant women suffering from malnutrition by a Western NGO. 
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The militants claimed that foreign NGOs wanted to harm future generations, hence 
they destroyed the food.333 
The conflict has also taken away men from households, leaving women to 
fend for themselves and to support their families. Another impact of the conflict has 
been that the hostile climate and lack of security has kept NGOs from venturing into 
Waziristan, which means there is little outside economic help for such women. War 
also diverts already-scarce resources away from women. “Poverty and unequal access 
to resources are often at the heart of women’s neglect and abuse, and this is especially 
true in war economies. Resources such as food and medical attention are often 
withheld from women and directed to male soldiers.”334 
Additionally, women are also living in fear of their male teenage children 
being abducted by militants from their homes.335 Many of these children are trained to 
become suicide bombers and indoctrinated into the militants’ radical ideology. Some 
families have had to pay as much as 50,000 rupees (about $1,000) to secure the 
release of their children; most others who do not have access to such a high sum of 
money have not been able to challenge the extremists who need human capital to 
fight their rebellion.336 For women, who rely deeply on their sons for material and 
emotional support, the abduction of children can have a devastating impact.  
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VI. Gender Inequality 
The issue of how women are treated in the tribal areas is not just a societal 
issue, it is also about human rights, including the basic right to freedom. Until it is 
looked upon that way not only in Waziristan, but also greater Pakistan, there is little 
hope for progress. Anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod argued that aid workers must not 
view these women with a sense of superiority because until they understand cultural 
norms and how they are enforced, progress is unattainable. What should be done by 
governments involved in the Waziristan conflict is to take a look at their own policies 
and see how they are impacting women and children.  
Abu-Lughod said it is important to be aware of differences in societies, and to 
promote women’s development by being respectful of alternative paths toward social 
change that might give women better lives.337 The Government of Pakistan has done 
little to provide the FATA agencies with schools, teachers and institutions. Maternal 
health care is in just as much of a despicable shape. Until basic services to women are 
improved and institutions set up to provide women safety from abuses, females in the 
tribal Pashtun society have few opportunities to move beyond their present distressing 
condition.  
The situation in the tribal areas is complex because men in power are strongly 
against women’s schooling and, in many cases, modern health measures. 
Nevertheless, it is important to create awareness about what basic education can do to 
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not only raise the quality of women’s lives, but that of their families and the wider 
society. By working closely with tribes, such measures are not impossible, as has 
been proven before. One example is that of Dr. Begum Jan, a Pashtun doctor and 
women’s rights activist who heads the Tribal Women Welfare Association (TWWA), 
an organization with the goal of empowering women in FATA. She has established 
11 centers across the region to provide medical training to women.338 Jan has 
reiterated that aid coming to Pakistan for the tribal areas rarely reaches the group it is 
designated for, and lack of economic opportunities and high illiteracy make the 
FATA agencies more vulnerable to Taliban propaganda.339 Another group is 
Khwendo Kher (Sister’s Home), an NGO started by Maryam Bibi that aims to 
increase literacy rate among Pashtun women.340 Since 1993, the organization has 
registered 10,000 girls in its schools.341 It is important for the Government of 
Pakistan, USAID and other NGOs that aim to improve women’s situation in FATA to 
work with organizations such as the TWWA and Khwendo Khel, and employ their 
expertise to assess how women’s education and health measures can be expanded. 
Security is also an important feature and currently, the conditions are 
precarious for men and worse for women. When men join violence entrepreneurs or 
are killed, there is little protection for women in society. As was the case in 
Afghanistan, the conflict in the tribal areas of Pakistan raises the chance of violent 
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crimes against women, including rape, theft and murders. The United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP)’s 1994 Human Development Report described 
human security as a necessary condition to peace. It stated: “The world can never be 
at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. The search for security in 
such a milieu lies in development, not in arms.”342 
History has important lessons for current policymakers, if they choose to heed 
them. One does not have to look far to see what disastrous effects war can have on the 
social and moral fabric of society. As journalist Ahmed Rashid pointed out: “Twenty 
years of continuous warfare has destroyed Afghan civil society, the clan community 
and family structure which provided an important cushion of relief in an otherwise 
harsh economic landscape… When Kabul’s women looked at themselves in the 
mirror, even before the Taliban captured the city, they saw only despair.”343 Women 
in Afghanistan enjoyed much more freedom than their tribal counterparts before the 
advent of the Taliban. Years of war destroyed Afghanistan’s educational system and 
while education statistics have improved in recent years, the country is still 
recovering from what it lost during years of conflict. Despite the rise in educational 
levels, the country is not anywhere near what it would have been had it not 
experienced a series of conflicts, the legacy of which will take a long time to 
eradicate. If Pakistanis, Americans and the militants do not take a lesson from the 
havoc created in Afghanistan after years of bloody wars, Waziristan could face the 
same dark predicament with even worse consequences. Women already form the 
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most marginalized group in the tribal society, and further erosion of their families, 
homes and lands because of the ongoing conflict would only worsen their situation 























“No man who has read a page of Indian history 
 will ever prophesy about the frontier.”  
Lord Curzon, Freedom of City of London Speech. 20 July, 1904344 
 
 Waziristan has had a long and turbulent history. For nearly a century, the 
British tried to tame the warrior tribes through various policies and strategies. First, 
they took the approach that non-interference would allow the tribes to keep their way 
of life and hence, not affect the rest of the India. That changed as sour relations and a 
subsequent war with the Afghans made British lawmakers realize that they needed a 
more coherent policy for the tribes, who served as gatekeepers of the northwest 
borders of India. The Great Game and the concern about Russia’s advances to India 
played a significant role in shaping the Raj’s policy. Many British lawmakers were 
convinced that Russia was on a mission to take over Central Asia, and could pose a 
threat to Britain’s Indian Empire if not checked. To secure their power and 
legitimacy, the British tried to establish relations with the Afghanistan and the tribes, 
many of whom were paid allowances by the Amir. By the time they left the 
subcontinent in 1947, the British had at least fought four bloody wars with the 
Afghans and several small-scale and major wars with the tribes.  
 Following the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the government, more preoccupied 
with Kashmir and its eastern border with India, chose to leave the tribes on their own. 
Calls for an independent Pukhtunistan were stifled by paying allowances to the tribes 
                                                 
344 Davies, The North-West Frontier, 174. 
 115
to remain within Pakistan’s boundaries. Yet, the Government of Pakistan never 
enforced its laws and regulations on the tribes, allowing them to settle their own 
disputes through the tribal jirga. Women’s situation, which has improved slightly in 
the rest of the country, remains very much the same in the tribal areas as it was during 
the time of the British rule. Communications infrastructure is weak and schools are 
few and far away. The only roads some cities have are ones that were once built by 
the British prior to partition. It is not uncommon to still find people in the Frontier 
traveling by donkey as only the elite can afford to keep cars. Families still live in mud 
houses. The maliks, prior to the advent of the Taliban, lived in large complexes that 
included their own private mosque, but the organizational structure of the tribal 
community has changed considerably since the violence entrepreneurs have come to 
power. 
 The Afghan Taliban were ethnic Pashtuns who were regarded by many as 
fighting Islam’s holy war. The Taliban movements that have spun out from FATA 
today are true to the same ideology. They claim they want to see an Islamic state with 
strict enforcement of shariah law. They have banned books and movies, set fire to 
music and movie shops and made the burkha mandatory for women. In Waziristan, 
women enjoyed few rights and there has not been any history of poetry and music, 
like other Pashtun regions. But many other parts of FATA and the settled areas had a 
rich culture and tradition of poetry, education, culture and oral history. One example 
is the valley of Swat to the east of FATA. The city was popular for its tourism and 
development of women’s education sector. The wave of current militancy threatens to 
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wipe out the progress and traditions of these areas. The current conflict has destroyed 
an already weak infrastructure. Violence entrepreneurs are radicalizing young 
Pashtun boys into their ideology. Meanwhile, many elders and women are being 
forced to flee from their homes in fear of killings by the militants and concern about 
aerial bombardment by Pakistani and U.S. governments. The Pakistani military, for 
the most part, has been relying on air attacks because it is unable to infiltrate through 
the mountainous terrain to get rid of the militants. The Taliban have been retaliating 
with rocket-propelled grenades, machine-gun fire and roadside bombs. Even the 
Frontier Corps, members of which are selected from various tribes, have been brutally 
attacked by violence entrepreneurs.345 The Taliban are reported to be digging trenches 
to encircle towns and overrun them.346 The New York Times described the scene in 
one FATA town where government and Taliban are involved in heavy fighting. 
Residents of Khar and the nearby town of Loe Sam were forced to escape on 
foot, and then hitched rides on whatever transportation they could find, said 
Maroof Shah, 40, a farmer from Loe Sam. The 23 members of his extended 
family climbed into a truck taking onions to market in Peshawar, he said… 
Many women and children had difficulty crossing rivers swollen with recent 
rains, and some drowned as they tried to flee, he said.347 
 
I. Filling a Vacuum 
 The FATA region is one of Pakistan’s most economically impoverished areas. 
Education rates are low because of a lack of schooling facilities, male hostility to 
women’s education; hospitals are few and without adequate care and there are few 
industries or jobs to keep tribesmen busy. Many rear sheep and cattle or are involved 
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in farming activities, which have dried up since the beginning of the conflict. The one 
trade activity that has been booming is that of drugs and arms. FATA serves as the 
transit route between Afghanistan, the world’s largest opium producer, and the rest of 
the world. But the drug trade has little direct beneficial impact on the general public. 
It is concentrated in the hands of the drug barons, most of whom are part of the 
Taliban movements and fund the militancy against the government.  
 The Pashtun are a proud people who have always resisted what they deemed 
outside influences. But the Taliban, both that ruled Afghanistan and those that are 
part of the current war, are homegrown. These young violence entrepreneurs hail 
from the tribes. Many of them are Mahsuds, the one tribe that the British found most 
difficult to control. As one tribe gains more power, it subdues other tribes, a 
phenomenon which has recurred through history. But this time, the conflict is not 
bound to FATA alone. It impacts the stability of Pakistan, which is being challenged 
by the rise of radical ideologies around the country. It also affects the U.S., which 
believes that the “war on terror” cannot be won without rooting out Al-Qaeda which 
they suspect is hiding in the tribal areas, most probably in one of the Waziristan 
agencies.  
 The USAID has defined several programs which it plans to implement in 
FATA. But until the security situation is resolved, USAID and even Pakistani aid 
workers are unlikely to be able to enter those areas.  
 Caroe believed strongly that development schemes in FATA would help both 
the tribes and the state of Pakistan. He felt that the British had been successful in 
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keeping Baluchistan tribes content by implementing economic reforms, including 
infrastructure and schools. Journalist and author Ahmed Rashid has been voicing the 
same opinion 60 years after the British left the Indian subcontinent. “The vacuum 
(that has led Islamic radicalism to flourish) has been created by the lack of effective 
state controls, the deprivation of the people and the lack of opportunities such as in 
education and jobs.”348  
II. Conflict Costs 
 One of the chief costs of the conflict is the decline in public trust, both toward 
the Pakistani government and local chiefs. Mohammed Khan, a resident of the tribal 
areas, fled with four of his six children, and an extended family of 18. He said he was 
opposed to the Taliban at first. As he was escaping from his native village of Sadiq 
Abad, he asked for protection at a government compound but was told it was for 
government officials only. “Today we are homeless, shelterless and without education 
for our children,” he said.349 Tribesmen who do not side with the Taliban feel like 
they have no help from the Government of Pakistan in rooting out terrorists. The 
government’s military build-up, arbitrary arrests of civilians and search operations, as 
well as the intense army action against foreign militants in Waziristan for the last six 
years has made locals wary of the government’s motives. “Seen locally as an 
invading army, this has inspired fanatical resistance, undermined the civil 
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administration in Waziristan, and helped spread Taliban rule outside the tribal areas 
and into NWFP itself.”350  
The conflict between the Taliban and the U.S. backed Pakistani military has 
also undermined the authority and capacity of the tribal elders.  
Fata is now almost entirely controlled by the Pakistani Taleban militias who in 
turn provide protection to the Afghan Taleban and to al-Qaeda. Over the last 
few years the army has failed to protect those tribal elders and people opposed 
to the Taleban, as a result they have either been killed or fled… Now the 
Pakistani Taleban are expanding their area of control in the settled areas of the 
North West Frontier Province and have reached Attock on the Indus river, 
which is really the cultural and social dividing line between Afghanistan-
Central Asia and Punjab and the Indian subcontinent. This is a very dangerous 
development.351 
 
Families report that their sons are being forcibly recruited into militant groups, 
and there is mass looting and complete lack of law. The battle between foreign 
militants and the Pakistani government has caused many poor people, who already 
lived well below the poverty line, to migrate to Peshawar in search of security and 
jobs. Ahmed Rashid estimated there are present between 200,000 and 400,000 
refugees from FATA scattered in other parts of Pakistan, a relatively large number 
considering there are only about 3 million people who live in FATA.352  
The effects in terms of repression, loss of security, income and service access, 
displacement and military harassment, and other such phenomena are 
considerable… If we consider that the imposition of security checks, patrols, 
curfews, restrictions on access to farmlands and other resources, 
discriminatory employment practices, closure of schools and other facilities, 
enforced use of identity cards, and so on, are all a part of critical military 
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strategy in South Asia, it may have an immense impact on the lives of 
children and their families.353 
 
The legacy of conflict can be felt for many decades after it’s over. 
Afghanistan is one example. The country has yet to recover from the ideology of 
radical Islam that was fostered during and after the Soviet-Afghan war. FATA 
provided the breeding ground for many of the Taliban who fought against non-
Pashtuns in the Afghan civil war, and this legacy of militancy continues to this day.   
Another cost of the conflict in Pakistan is that it has further worsened its 
already shaky relations with Afghanistan. Both countries have been rivals historically 
and this conflict has further fueled feelings of mistrust. U.S. lawmakers are urging the 
Pakistani government to show more substantial results in the tribal areas. Afghans in 
towns bordering Pakistan are becoming victims of attacks from violence 
entrepreneurs that cross the border freely. In a country where the security situation 
remains unpredictable, especially in eastern Afghanistan, the rise of militants in 
Pakistan is only worsening the situation.  
III. The Future 
 The Governments of Pakistan, U.S. and Afghanistan have acknowledged that 
they need to do more to root out “terrorists,” which would involve implementing 
more sound economic measures to steer people away from violence entrepreneurs. 
Pakistan and its allies are caught in a quandary because while there is a need for 
economic development measures, they are also logistically difficult to implement 
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because of the monopoly of violence entrepreneurs and the complete breakdown of 
law and order in the areas where they have ascended to power. What the government 
can do is keep the currents of militancy from spreading to parts of the FATA that 
have thus far been safe from Taliban-type groups. The same can be said for settled 
areas, which are at great risk of falling into the hands of militants if there are not any 
measures taken to stop them. In Waziristan Agencies and regions where violence 
entrepreneurs prevent foreign aid workers from entering, the Government of Pakistan 
can attempt to foster serious negotiations. But in the coming years, it will be 
important to take steps to ensure that the risk of the conflict escalating into other 
tribal areas is reduced, if not eliminated.  
The first important step would be to reduce rent-seeking opportunities and 
corruption at both the military and tribal level. Aid that is meant for the poorest of the 
poor rarely trickles down to the people it is meant for because of the government 
bureaucracy. In the tribal areas, any projects have to be first approved by the central 
government, then the provincial government, then the Political Agent, and then the 
tribes themselves. It does not follow a linear progression; rather, it has to go through 
multiple channels and people and offices. Additionally, divisions within Pakistan’s 
central government need to be resolved. The coalition of opposition parties that came 
to power in early 2008 threatened to impeach Pervez Musharraf, leading him to resign 
from his post. The coalition itself is hardly united, with the Pakistan People’s Party 
demanding a different political and economic agenda than Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan 
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Muslim League party. At the same time, tribal areas that lack strong institutions are 
finding themselves under the leadership of mullahs who want to impose shariah law. 
The pouring of foreign money into Pakistan should be monitored closely. This 
not just includes U.S. aid, but also money flowing in from the Middle East. This 
funding is mostly used to encourage a more radical interpretation of Islam in 
madrassahs that fill the void of schooling in cities where there are no public or non-
Islamic private schools. Musharraf vowed to track foreign money inflows into the 
country during the early part of his post-coup regime, but that task has met with 
mediocre success.  
It is also important to implement economic measures at the grassroots level 
that benefit local people and deter them from joining rebel forces. Investing in human 
capital by expanding education and available health services is one key way to build 
the economy. While militants have taken over a big part of FATA and other settled 
areas, economic development measures in other cities where they have not yet 
infiltrated can help build a strong civil society and pool of educated Pakistanis.  
Institutions that give legal protection to minorities, guarantee freedom from 
expropriation, grant freedom from repudiation of contracts, and facilitate 
cooperation for public services would constrain the amount of damage that 
one ethnic group could do to another… Ethnically diverse nations that wish to 
endure in peace and prosperity must build good institutions.354  
 
A strong governance structure is also required to prevent militants from 
establishing parallel and illegal administrative structures. One of the chief ways that 
the Brussels-based Crisis Group argues that this can be done is by incorporating 
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FATA into the NWFP as a Provincially Administered Tribal Area (PATA), under 
executive control of the regular province and national court system. In addition, they 
propose allowing political parties to campaign in FATA and introduce party-based 
elections. While such a measure would be difficult to implement if the tribes do not 
accept it, there is a need to promote some sort of an institutional structure to prevent 
militants from filling the void. In terms of education, health care and employment, by 
bringing FATA’s statistics up to the level of other regions, the government will have 
a stronger chance of reducing conflict than by simple military might. The 
Government of Pakistan and its allies still have a part to play in the economic 
development of regions of FATA that currently are not monopolized by militants.   
Afghanistan and the international community also need to address their 
shortcomings and failures in implementing safety and security policies, and provide 
not only sufficient funds for reconstruction and nation-building to the Pashtun 
population, but also to ensure that aid reaches the people it is aimed at. Afghanistan 
has a long way to go in terms of development and security. The Government of 
Pakistan also needs to unite and place more emphasis on problems in the country 
rather than quarreling amongst themselves.   
FATA will play a crucial role in the trajectory of the “war on terror.” North 
and South Waziristan Agencies, which are isolated from the rest of Pakistan 
historically, economically and socially, will be at the forefront of the war against Al-
Qaeda. U.S. lawmakers have said consistently that Osama bin Laden is finding refuge 
among local tribesmen and Taliban. The conflict that is taking place in the northwest 
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Frontier of Pakistan cannot be solved with military might alone, as the British 
learned. Measures need to be taken to eliminate policies that enable rent-seeking and 
foster income inequality, that instead develop the economy of the tribal areas, which, 
today, is mostly based on drug trade concentrated into the hands of a small sliver of 
society.  
The Great Game that was one played out in the Indian subcontinent between 
the British and the Russians has not gone away; the only difference is now there are 
new players and new strategies. As Caroe would say, it is merely “new wine in old 
bottles.” The Great Game will continue to play out in the foothills of FATA for a long 
















British Frontier Expeditions355  
 
 
Year Tribes Reason 
1849 Baizais --- 
1850 Kohat pass Afridis --- 
1851 Miranzai Tribes --- 
1851-2 Mohmands --- 
1851-2 Utmanzai Wazirs Tribes defaulted on their payments to 
the chief responsible for collection. 
1852 Ranizais --- 
1852 Darwesh Khel Waziris --- 
1852-3 Hassanzais --- 
1853 Shiranis --- 
1853 Adam Khel Afridis Tribesmen closed the Kohat Pass and 
rose in rebellion despite being paid an 
allowance for “protecting” travelers. 
1854 Mohmands --- 
1855 Aka Khel Afridis --- 
1855 Miranzai  --- 
1855 Rabia Khel Orakzais --- 
1856 Turis --- 
1857 Yusufzais Pashtun mujahideen raised arms 
against the British during the Indian 
Mutiny. 
1859 Khudu Khels --- 
1859-60 Kabul Kher Wazirs Tribes’ raided salt mines, resulting in a 
tug of war over control of 
communication routes. 
1860 Mahsud Wazirs Tribes attacked caravans and raided the 
town of Tank. Blockade against the 
Mahsuds by the British lasted for 
nearly 12 years. 
1863 Sayyid Ahmad and his 
followers 
The group claimed jihad against the 
British. This expedition was known as 
the “Ambela Campaign” after the 
strategic pass near which the fighting 
occurred.  
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1864 Mohmands --- 
1868 Bizoti Orakzais 
Black Mountain Tribes 
British continued their efforts to root 
out Sayyid Ahmad’s followers. This 
was the largest British force mounted 
on the Frontier up to this date. 
1869 Bizoti Orakzais --- 
1872 Dawaris --- 
1877 Jowaki Afridis --- 
1877-8 Jowaki Afridis --- 
1878 Utman Khels --- 
1878 Ranizais --- 
1878-9 Zakka Khel Afridis --- 
January 
1879 
Suliman Khel, Powindahs 
and others 
Tribes raided the town of Tank. 
1879 Zaimukhts --- 
1879-80 Mohmands --- 
1880 Bhittanis --- 
1880 Kabul Khel Wazirs --- 
1880 Malik Shahi Wazirs Tribes were punished for unpaid fines 
and penalties for minor offences, such 
as thefts of cattle and property.  
April 1880 Bhittanis of Jandola Tribesmen gathered to attack British. 
1881 Mahsuds Locals attacked a British post.  
1887 Bunerwals --- 
1888 Black Mountain Tribes --- 
1891 Orakzai Tribes attacked a British column 
attempting to construct pickets along 
the Samana Range. 
1894 Mullah Powindah and his 
men (mostly Mahsuds) 
The coalition of tribesmen attempted to 
expunge the British following the 
establishment of the Durand Line. 
1897-8 Various tribes In what was dubbed the “Great Tribal 
Uprising,” more than 60,000 troops 
were stationed in the frontier. Some 
British historians said it was religious 
uprising, others believed it was a 
concerted effort to drive the British 
from the area, while some others saw 
the events as unconnected to each 
other.  
1897-8 Maizarwals A dispute on payment of blood-money 
due to a Hindu man’s family. 
1900-1 Mahsud Wazirs Raids and attacks against the British 
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led the latter to stop distribution of 
allowances to the maliks and block the 
tribesmen from the settled areas. 
1902 Darwesh Khel Wazirs  
(in Kabul Khel) 
Tribesmen refused to hand over 
outlaws wanted by the British.  
1908 Zakka Khel Afridi 
 
Tribesmen robbed and murdered a 
wealthy Hindu merchant.  
1908 Mohmands  
1919-21 Wazirs and Mahsuds Tribal uprising in the aftermath of the 
Third Anglo-Afghan War. Total cost to 
British India of this campaign was 
estimated at more than £ 1 million, 
much greater than the actual cost of the 
war with Afghanistan. 
1923 Afridis  Locals kidnapped a young British girl. 
1930-1 Abd-ul-Ghaffar Khan and 
“Khudai Khitmatgars,” or 
“Servants of God.” 
A parallel administration started to 
develop outside of the British system 
that threatened to overthrow the latter. 
1930 Mahsuds --- 
1933 Mahsuds Afghans cross the Durand Line with 
the help of Nadir Khan in tribal 
territory. 
1936-8 Haji Mirza Ali Khan, the 
Faqir of Ipi, a Tori Khel 
mullah of the Utmanzai 
Wazirs, and several tribes in 
Waziristan 
An array of factors led to this 
expedition, including raiding and 
attacking by tribesmen. 
1939 Faqir of Ipi and Wazir 
tribes 
Religious uprising to uproot British 
forced from the Frontier.  
1937-40 Mahsuds A “holy man” from Syria came into the 
tribal territory to enlist the tribes to 
fight in Kabul, was ousted by British.  











Alim: Senior religious Islamic scholars. 
 
Badal: Revenge; also translated as exchange or reciprocity. It is one of the tenets of 
Pukhtunwali. 
 
Bibi: Women from wealthy families.  
 
Bibiane: Plural for bibi.  
 
Burkha: A covering of women that hides them from head to toe, with only their eyes 
visible. 
 
Daman: A great plain stretching between the Indus and the Sulaiman Mountain; a 
natural desert transformed by irrigation.  
 
Ghairilaqa: See ilaqa ghair. 
 
Gham: Grief or sadness. 
 
Hal Wayel: Speaking of the inner state. 
 
Haq Mehr: A pre-determined amount of money a man grants a woman after divorce 
 
Ilaqa Ghair: Also known as ghairilaqa, meaning “outside the area” or “foreign area.” 
 
Loya Jirga: The supreme council of elders. 
 
Jihad: Holy war, interpretation of which has been disputed among scholars.  
 
Jirga: A council of elders that deals with civil and criminal offenses and makes 
decisions for the tribe. 
 
Madrassahs: Religious schools. 
 
Maliks: Chiefs who act as intermediaries between the administration and the tribes.  
 
Maulanas: See Mullah. 
 
Melmastia: Hospitality; one of the tenets of Pukhtunwali. 
 
Mujahid: One who wages jihad.  
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Mujahideen: Term for the Afghan alliance that fought against the Russians in the 
Afghan-Soviet war. Plural for word mujahid. 
 
Mullahs: Religious leaders. Also referred to as Maulanas or Maulvis.  
 
Muwajib: System of allowances to the tribes started by the British. 
 
Nanawatee: Generosity to a defeated opponent; one of the tenets of Pukhtunwali. 
 
Nang: Pashtun hill tribes that organize social life according to Pukhtunwali. Also 
means honor, one of the tenets of Pukhtunwali.  
 
Pukhtunwali: The Pashtun tribal code which dictates the guidelines for living.  
 







Shariah: Islamic law. 
 
Talib: Arabic for student. 
 
Taliban: Plural of Talib.  
 
Talibanization: Term used to describe spread of Taliban ideology. 
 
Tor: Upholding female honor. 
 
Tora: Courage; one of the tenets of Pukhtunwali. 
 
Ulema: Plural for Alim.  
 
Wahabbism: Branch of Islam practiced by those who follow the teachings of Saudi 
scholar Muhammed Ibn Abdul Wahhab, who helped reintroduce a strict interpretation 
of shariah to the Arabian peninsula.  
 
Xadi: Joy or festivity. 
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